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Rape is an act of violence generally perpetrated by a male against 
a female. As a sex-linked crime, the incidence of rape may also reflect 
the cultural attitudes held by the dominant governing group. For thou-
sands of years, males have been valued more than have females. When a 
female was raped or otherwise violated, her assailant was punished (if 
he was punished) because of her relatedness to another man. Daughters, 
wives, and servants were protected primarily because the rape would de-
value the male possessor's property. Only in recent times has it begun 
to be recognized that the rape has profound effects on the female victim 
far beyond any cultural devaluing process. 
A few changes have occurred in social attitudes toward rape. One 
change focuses on the actual victim who is violated. This occurrence 
closely followed the publication of accounts of women seeking revenge 
against their rapist(s). For example, Inez Garcia shot and killed 
Miguel Jimenez and missed Louis Castillo, both of whom she said had 
raped her (Blitman & Green, 1975). Ms. Garcia was initially convicted 
of second-degree murder; later, she was acquitted ~Then the appeals judge 
allowed evidence supporting her story of rape to be introduced. JoAnne 
Little was tried on charges of first-degree murder, which carries an 
automatic death sentence in North Carolina, for stabbing jailer Clarence 
Alligood eleven times with his own ice pick. The autopsy report 
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contained evidence of recent sexual activity. Moreover, Mr. Alligood 
was found naked from the waist down. Although Mr. Alligood had been 
stabbed in the legs, there were no holes in his pants (Davis, 1975). 
Ms. Little was convicted of murder, but her conviction was overturned 
when the appeals court allowed evidence supporting her rape charge to 
be introduced. 
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Much of the current controversy-concerning rape involves the chang-
ing concepts of individual rights and criminal justice. In order to 
obtain an understanding of the dynamics of rape trials within the crimi-
nal justice system, a multifaceted investigation must be initiated. The 
investigation must consist of three major facets: (1) the legal require-
ments for the establishment of the crime of forcible rape; (2) the 
psychological factors which operate on both a cultural and personal 
level; and (3) the factors which operate during the trial itself. Each 
of these topics must be considered when investigating the variables 
affecting the verdict of any rape trial. 
CHAPTER II 
RAPE: AN OVERVIEW 
A. Rape in Society 
Delineation of the offenders, victims, and the crime of rape has 
been recent. The details vary geographically, individually, and tempo-
rally, yet certain consistencies appear. Rape is primarily a crime of 
youth for both offenders and victims. Physical and/or nonphysical 
coercion are usually present. Many victims know their assailants. 
These and other findings were not readily available in a concerted docu-
mented form until &~ir (1971) initiated a comprehensive investigation of 
the crime and noted the following. 
Forcible rape is mainly an intraracial event. 
The age group 15 to 19 years shows the highest rates for both 
victims and offenders. 
Both the victim and the defendant are usually unmarried. 
The offenders are usually ot low socio-economic status. 
Usually the victim and the defendant live in the same area. 
The most common hours in which rape occurs are 8:00 p.m. to 
2:00a.m., especially on weekends, with Saturday being the 
peak day. 
Of the rapists in this sample, 50 percent had a previous 
arrest record. 
Nineteen percent of the victims in this study had a prior arrest 
record, with the highest proportion for some type of sexual offense. 
Approximately 70 percent of the assailants planned the rape well in 
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advance; another 11 percent planned the rape in detail. The types of 
nonphysical coercion used by these rapists were temptation, verbal coer-
cion, intimidation by physical gestures, and intimidation with a weapon. 
The amount of violence inflicted on the victim was as follows: 
1. 15 percent used no physical force; 
2. 29 percent used roughness; 
3. 25 percent used "nonbrutal" beatings (requiring no hospitaliza-
tion); 
4. 20 percent used brutal beatings (requiring hospitalization); and 
5. 12 percent choked the victim. 
The victims responded in the following fashion: 
1. 18 percent of the victims put up a strong fight; 
2. 27 percent resisted; and 
3. Over 50 percent exhibited submissive behavior. 
In comparison, 18 percent of the rapists studied in a Victoria, 
Australia sample punched or beat the victim to the point of unconscious-
ness (Hodgens, McFadyen, Feilla & Daly, 1972). The rapists who had no 
accomplices overcame 39 percent of the victims in a struggle; one-third 
threatened or intimidated the victim. The victims capitulated for a 
variety of reasons: 52 percent required severe physical coercion, others 
submitted due to the intensity of instilled fear. 
Radzinowicz (1957) investigated the incidence of sex offenses occur-
ring in England and Wales during 1954, and categorized offenses into the 
following types: indecent assault on females, 50 percent; attempted un-
natural acts and assaults on males, 21 percent; indecencies with males, 
13 percent; statutory rape, 9 percent; unnatural offenses, 7 percent; 
rape, 2 percent; incest, 2 percent; statutory rape of females under the 
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age of 12 years, 1 percent. In comparison, sex offense figures collected 
by the New Jersey State Police in terms of percentages are as follows: 
exhibitionism, 18 percent; rape and statutory rape, 45 percent; perver-
sion, 14 percent; commercial sex, 7 percent; and unclassified, 16 percent 
(Tappan, 1950). 
Toch (1961), in a review of the literature, makes the following con-
clusions. Only a small proportion of sex offenders, approximately 20 
percent, uses force or duress on the victim. Contrary to public opinion, 
offenders convicted of forcible rape do not show subnormal intelligence. 
They are not found to be lower in intelligence than persons convicted of 
statutory rape, incestuous relations, and bestiality. lihen convicted 
sex offenders do not receive psychological treatment, they frequently 
are reconvicted for both sexual and nonsexual offenses. 
Many victims of rape know their assailants. One study reported 
that 78 percent of the victims aged 1 to 12 years knew their assailants, 
as did 82 percent of the 13 to 17 year old victims, 37 percent of the 
18 to 24 year olds, and 28 percent of the group 25 years old and older 
(Hayman, Stuart, Lewis & Grant, 1968). In contrast, the National Commis-
sion on the Causes and Preventions of Violence found that 53 percent of 
all rape victims were total strangers to their assailant(s); 30 percent 
were slightly acquainted; 7 percent had a family relationship; and 3 
percent had a previous close association (Brownmiller, 1975, p. 351). 
Any males, and particularly all females, are potential sexual 
assault victims. No easy way to avoid the potential for sexual assault 
exists. For example, in the District of Columbia, 82 percent of the 
rape victims studied had "good" reputations (Griffin, 1971). Traditional 
and highly moral persons may be victimized as readily as "immoral" or 
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nontraditional persons when vulnerable to an attack or due to certain 
demographic characteristics. Age, intelligence, socio-economic status, 
and locale will often be determining factors of vulnerability. The very 
young, the aged, and the mentally handicapped are frequently victimized. 
For example, Blake (1977) reported that most of the victims seen at the 
Sexual Trauma Center, which operates in conjunction with the Central 
Emergency Medical Service of the San Francisco Department of Public 
Health, are in the age bracket of 18 to 25 years old. Also, Blake (1977) 
noted that prostitutes and homosexuals are frequently seen to be victims 
of violent sexual assault, and their assailants tend to be more brutal. 
B. Disposition of Cases 
The FBI Uniform Crime Reports (1975) indicates that the sex age 
group most often arrested for this crime were males aged 16 to 24 years. 
Disposition of the charged rapes were as follows: 
51 percent of the charges were cleared by arrest. 
Of those arrested, 58 percent were prosecuted. 
46 percent of the prosecutions were dismissed or acquitted 
due to prosecution problems. 
42 percent of those prosecuted were found guilty of forcible 
rape and 12 percent were convicted of lesser offenses. 
Thus, from the total number of reported rapes, 12.42 percent of the 
assailants were eventually convicted of forcible rape. 
Some national statistics as provided by the FBI help provide a 
broader picture of the problem of rape. The FBI Uniform Crime Reports 
(1975) included assaults to commit forcible rape with the statistics on 
forcible rape proper. As reported by the FBI in 1975, 56,090 forcible 
rapes were reported--51 reported rapes per every 100,000 females in the 
United States. This rate comprises 5 percent of the total volume of 
violent crime. The volume of forcible rape nas increased 48 percent 
over the 1970 figures and increased 6 percent over the 1976 figures. 
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Of the reported crimes, 74 percent were actual rapes by force, with the 
remainder attempts or assaults in order to commit forcible rape. As a 
national average, 15 percent of the reported rapes were classified as 
unfounded. This figure does not differentiate between false accusations 
and those unprosecutable rapes in which the police cannot legally or 
evidentially establish a prosecutable case. Police officers are more 
likely to judge a reported rape as legitimate or "founded" if it in-
volves a rape perpetrated by a stranger and involving overt violence 
{Police discretion and the judgment that a crime has been committed, 
1968). Of all of the "unfounded" rapes reported to the New York Police 
Department in a six-month period in 1975, only 4 percent were actually 
found to be false charges. 
c. Patterns of Rape Interactions 
A consistency in the patterns of planned rapes emerge. Selkin 
{1975) identified four distinct phases. In phase one, the rapist selects 
a vulnerable woman in an accessible environment. The second phase in-
volves the confrontation of the victim. The rapist threatens her suffi-
ciently that she must respond to him in some fashion. If her response 
is submissive or fearful, he knows she can be intimidated. In phase 
three, the actual rape is perpetrated. In the final phase, the post-
rape interaction, the rapist may act apologetic, try further intimida-
tion to prevent any report to the authorities, or physically harm or 
even murder the victim. 
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D. The Rape Victim and the Psychological 
Response to Rape 
Medea and Thomson (1974) found the following pattern of results 
among rape victims: 
42 percent said they felt afraid of men; 
28 percent said it affected their sex lives; 
27 percent felt less independent or more afraid of being 
on their own; 
23 percent said it damaged their trust in male-female rela-
tionships; 
18 percent felt worthless or lost self-respect; 
17 percent felt hostile toward men; 
10 percent sustained physical injuries; 
7 percent reported suicidal impulses; and 
5 percent reported nightmares. 
The victim reactions to the rape as a stressful situation goes 
through four general stages, although the intensity and duration of 
these stages vary (Notman & Madelson, 1976). In the anticipatory or 
threat phase, anxiety can cue the individual regarding the potential 
danger inherent in a given situation. In the impact phase, the indivi-
dual victim responds with varying degrees of disintegration to the rape 
experience. The amount of trauma and the adaptive capacity of the vic-
tim function as parameters. The post-traumatic or recoil phase is the 
phase in which the victim gradually regains emotional expression, self-
awareness, memory, and behavioral control. Group support and a sense 
of community are of help in this stage, although the majority of women 
may be denied support by their "intimates" and the community. The 
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fourth stage, the post-traumatic reconstitution phase, directly concerns 
self-esteem. The victim, who has lost her s~nse of invulnerability, may 
blame herself for her lack of perception of the dangerous situation. 
Notman and Madelson (1976) further discussed the general conse-
quences to a victim of rape. They indicated that the sense of helpless-
ness is heightened, conflicts about dependence and independence are 
intensified, devaluing self-criticism and guilt may interfere with 
trusting relationships with others, particularly men. Difficulty in 
handling anger and aggression are common reactions, as well as the ex-
perience of persistent feelings of vulnerability. 
In the past, victims of rape have often been denied professional 
psychiatric services. The confusion concerning the rape issue in 
Freudian thought implies that rape happens to marginal people who in 
some way collude with the experience (Notman & Madelson, 1976). In 
other words, on some level the victim deserved what she experienced. 
The functions served by this view include protection of the current 
belief structure of the professional and protection from individual 
feelings of vulnerability and culpability. It avoids investigation of 
the violent objectification aspect of rape in favor of a sexual grati-
fication focus. The professional is absolved from any guilt or respon-
sibility by holding such a conceptualization of the dynamics of rape. 
However, these types of attitudes have been changing since women have 
become involved with the various phases of rape crisis intervention. 
E. Victims as Jurors 
As previously mentioned, many women do not report their rape(s) 
and will have occasion to serve as jurors at some time in their lives. 
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What effect will their victimization have on their services during a 
jury trial of rape? The effect of victimiza~ion among the jurors may 
well shape the deliberation proceedings. Two beliefs concerning the 
effects of victimization have been advanced (Heilman, Slochower & 
Deutsch, 1976). One belief holds that the experience of victimization 
will make one more sensitive and compassionate to other victims. The 
other states that victimization creates a need to disassociate oneself 
from, and reject, other victims. Much of the variance in reactions may 
be accounted for in terms of the effect of the victimization experience 
on the victim's self-regard. m1en victimization fosters a feeling of 
negative self-regard, the victim often rejects the self and similar 
others (Clark & Clark, 1947; Moriarity, 1974). The situation which 
fosters negative self-regard is any victimization which is attributed to 
personal characteristics or behavior. Rape is a good example of a crime 
in which the victim is held responsible for her own victimization. The 
element of chance selection is not accorded as much significance as is 
her responsibility to avoiding vulnerability. Somehow the rape becomes 
her fault, and a negative sense of self-regard closely follows her 
acceptance of fault. 
Support for the hypothesized relationship between victimization and 
self-regard has been found in non-jury experimental studies. Heilman, 
Slochower, and Deutsch (1976) reported that victim-subjects behaved 
differently than nonvictim-subjects only when they believed that they 
had been responsible for their victimization. When self-regard was not 
derogated by the fact of victimization, no effect was found on attitudes 
concerning other victims. Thus, it seems likely that women jurors who 
have been raped at some prior time in their lives may respond in 
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diametrically opposed fashions. To the extent that they assume culpabil-
ity in their own sexual assault, they logica:ly would be expected to 
derogate the victim's story and acquit the defendant. If they reject 
personal culpability, they may serve as unbiased, objective jurors. Yet 
women may not be able to resist cultural, social, and personal prescrip-
tions of responsibility and guilt for becoming the victim of sexual 
assault. The woman juror who accepts responsibility for her own victim-
ization becomes an additional instrument in the victimization of another. 
F. Summary 
Certain consistencies in rape can be established. Forcible rape is 
mainly an intraracial event with predominantly youthful offenders and 
victims. Physical and non-physical coercion are used to subdue the vic-
tim. Over 50 percent of the victims exhibit submissive behaviors. Con-
victed sex offenders who do not receive psychological treatment are 
found to be frequent recidivists. Many victims know their assailants, 
particularly since often they live in the same neighborhood. Persons 
with good reputations may be victimized as readily as persons with "im-
moral" reputations, given a situation of vulnerability. The more vulner-
able to assault the victim is, such as the very old or young and the 
mentally handicapped, the more likely they will be victimized. Few 
rapists are convicted, as indicated by the FBI Uniform Crime Reports. 
The rape interaction involves four phases: selection of the victim, 
confrontation, perpetration of the rape, and the post-rape interaction. 
Victims have reported a variety of reactions, ranging from personal 
changes such as lowered self-respect to interpersonal changes such as 
hostility toward men and loss of trust. The victim reaction also goes 
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through four general stages: the anticipatory or threat phase, the im-
pact phase with varying degrees of psychological disintegration, the 
post-traumatic or recoil phase in which the victim regains emotional 
expression and behavioral control, and the post-traumatic reconstitution 
phase in which self-esteem must deal with personal vulnerability. Pro-
fessional psychiatric services have recently become more responsive to 
the psychological needs of rape victims. 
Rape victims who become jurors at some later date may respond with 
more sensitivity and compassion to other victims or may disassociate 
themselves from other victims. The variance may depend on the effect 
of the prior victimization on self-regard. If the victim juror assumes 
culpability in their own sexual assault, they would be expected to 
derogate the current victim. If they reject personal culpability, they 
may serve as unbiased jurors. 
CHAPTER III 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES ON RAPE 
A. Analytic Psychology 
Most psychological explanations regarding rape are derived from one 
of two historical positions, i.e., the analytic or Freudian view and the 
humanistic/feminist view. The most common theoretical position is de-
rived from Freudian thought concerning the nature of male and female 
sexuality. In Freud's conceptualization (Cleckley, 1957), the energy 
behind the sexual instinct, termed libido, is always masculine. Libido 
is the fused sexual and aggressive personality energies. This suggests 
that Freud was fusing the sexual and aggressive energies of libido in 
theorizing of female sexuality as surely as he accepted their fusion in 
male sexuality. He postulated that any sexual activity on the part of 
the female must arise from her masculine component. The distinction 
between male and female sexuality was culminated when female sexuality 
was posited to contain a masochistic component rather than an aggressive 
component during sexual passion (Bromberg, 1956). In a footnote speci-
fically addressing sexual attack on a woman, Freud {1901) states " 
the attack of the man cannot be warded off through the full muscular 
strength of a woman because a portion of the unconscious feelings of the 
one attacked meets it with ready acceptance" (p. 181). Thus, the theo-
retical position bolstering the concept that "every woman wants to be 
raped" had been advanced in psycho-analytic literature. 
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The assumption of the fusion of sexual and aggressive personality 
components continues to find expression even in contemporary Freudians. 
In a psycho-analytic interpretation of the myth of Kainis, Devereaux 
(1957) reveals his underlying assumptions about the world by his appli-
cation of male sexuality principles to those of female sexuality. In 
brief, the myth of Kainis involves a Lapith chief who had once been a 
woman. Kainis was raped by Poseidon; who then offered restitution by 
agreeing to grant any request she desired. She asked to be made a man 
and made invulnerable. Her desire was granted. After some time, Zeus 
incited the Centaurs to assault Kainis and he was killed. At the burial 
the corpse was found to be that of a woman. Devereau interprets the 
myth of Kainis in terms of traditional psycho-analytic concepts such as 
the "female penis fantasy." He cits the notion that a woman may 
"acquire" a penis as compensation for her rape. Kainis has sought pro-
tection against forceful penetration and "refeminization." "There 
remains, of course, the possible resurgence of passive-submissive femi-
nine wishes, which may find expression in the male by means of passive 
homosexual impulses" (Devereaux, 1957, p. 398). The essential point is 
that the dynamics of the interpretation have an unquestioned assumption 
about the nature of sexuality in general and about the distinguishable 
character of female and male sexuality. The heart of the assumption is 
the view of sexuality as a fusion of sexual and aggressive energies, 
with differing values assigned to male and female sexuality. Devereaux 
(1957) seems to assume that it is the penis Kainis desires rather than 
protection from rape, protection that her status of femaleness can never 
grant her. Passive-submissive "feminine" wishes are assumed to be the 
counterpart of male homosexual impulses, a view obviously consistent 
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with the concept of "penis-envy." In utilizing this framework it appears 
that all the world is structured around the penis. Freud (1959) theo-
rized that a male child could respond with "horror of the mutilated crea-
ture or triumphant contempt for her" (p. 43) to the sight of a girl's 
genital region with two reactions, both of which might permanently affect 
the male's relation to women. In contrast, a female child's envy of the 
penis has the effect of fostering a sense of inferiority. 
When she has passed beyond her first attempt at explaining her 
lack of a penis as being a punishment personal to herself and 
has realized that the sexual character is a universal one, she 
begins to feel the contempt felt by men for a sex which is the 
lesser in so important a respect, and, at least in holding 
that opinion, insists on being like a man (p. 44). 
In addition, Freudian thought focused upon the necessity of eliminating 
"clitorial sexuality" as a precondition for the healthy development of 
femininity (p. 45). In this author's opinion, the Freudian focus is an 
unrealistic, undocumented basis on which to build a theory of female 
sexuality. Freud himself prefaced his work with the disclaimer that it 
"stands in urgent need of confirmation before its value or lack of value 
can be decided" (Freud, 1959, p. 41). It is unfortunate that his assump-
tions were accepted without proper scientific and humanitarian evaluation 
by his followers. 
B. Humanism/Feminism 
The opposing position of humanism/feminism rejects traditional male-
originated theories of female sexuality as well as assignment of female 
responsibility for rape. Female sexuality is only now beginning to be 
self-defined: the elements distinguishing freely chosen sexuality and 
forced choice sexuality are yet to be psychologically delineated. Other 
issues which evolve from this include choices concerning sexual matters 
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but also relative power in sex. Power in sex is a common interpersonal 
issue and an issue in therapy situations. Addressing the problem of 
male therapists' sexual exploitation of female clients, Chesler (1974, 
p. 80) points out that the unconscious signals that the therapist in a 
psychiatric setting puts out are "Power, money, the promise of romantic 
love, the promise of instant identity, the promise of protection." 
These are stimuli that women have been culturally conditioned to respond 
to in men. Outside the therapy situation, many women trade sexual favors 
to men in response to the same type of signals. The distinction between 
forcedly chosen and freely chosen sexuality is blurred when the one part-
ner is in a powerless and deprived condition. Even so, forcedly chosen 
sexuality is not synonymous with forced sex regardless of the conceptual-
ization of analytic psychology. 
The confusion between consensual sexual activity and rape does not 
occur in feminist thought. The feminist position on the rape issue em-
phasizes the importance of societal influences by focusing upon such 
factors as encouragement of male violence and aggressivity, the structure 
of patriarchy, and the institution of heterosexuality (Caldwell, 1976), 
as well as the cultural view of women as the property of males. "Rape, 
as an issue, was a means of analyzing the psychological and political 
structures of oppression in our society," state Connell and Wilson (1974, 
p. 3). The tolerance and encouragement of aggression among males help 
structure a situation in which the male is given license to victimize the 
female. Research evidence indicates that mothers accept aggressive be-
havior toward themselves from sons more than from daughters, while 
fathers react in an opposite manner (Sears, Rau & Alpert, 1965). This 
sets a modeling precedent which may contribute to a child's idea of a 
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proper victim. The structure of patriarchy is a cultural influence 
which contributes to a "rape consciousness" ..:.n its participants. Patri-
archy has been defined by Webster's (1969) dictionary as "a system of 
social organization marked by the supremacy of the father of the clan or 
family, the legal dependence of the wives and children, and the reckon-
ing of descent and inheritance in the male line." Matriarchy is defined 
"as a system of social organization in which descent and inheritance are 
traced through the female line." The definition of matriarchy thus does 
not include mention of interpersonal supremacy, or legal or cultural 
dependence. Matriarchy does not seem to be based on power relations or 
the systematic oppression of any group. The treatment of rape under 
these two differing perspectives, however, highlights the oppressive base 
of patriarchy. Concern with the chastity of the rape victim with its 
conjoint emphasis on virginity and monogamy is a necessary concern only 
under a patriarchial system in which the woman is the property of the 
man, making her violation an indirect violation of him. The social util-
ity of chivalry is in perpetuating a system in which the woman is pro-
tected by a man from other men. The creator of the original prototype 
of chivalry, embodied in The Knights of the Roundtable, was Sir Thomas 
Mallory, who was arrested and found guilty of repeated incidents of rape 
{Caldwell, 1976). At no point does chivalry recognize that the violation 
of a woman is her own violation, that she may be interested in seeking 
redress for her own motives, and that she is not responsible for the 
perpetuation of a crime in which she became a victim. 
The institution of heterosexuality is also a contributing element 
in rape. The amount of conditioning in the culture encouraging hetero-
sexuality is a powerful force. Heterosexuality in conjunction with 
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patriarchy defines the appropriate sex-roles and behaviors of its parti-
cipants. The male is accorded the dominant :;?Osition, the female is 
accorded the submissive posture. Aggression and violence are masculine 
provinces, whereas the female is relegated to passivity. Thus, hetero-
sexuality becomes defined in.terms of relative interpersonal power and 
creates a class of victims who have been conditioned toward those very 
traits which will work against freeing them from victimization. Addi-
tionally, males who totally accept the social definition of masculinity, 
i.e., a "real man's man," may derogate femininity as it has been defined 
and therefore derogate those persons who behave as socially acceptable 
females are expected to behave. 
c. Research 
Rape from a feminist perspective is viewed as a fulfillment of the 
culturally based concept of male supremacy, a symbolization of offender 
inferiority, and an overcompensation for sexual inadequacy (Melani & 
Fodaski, 1974). Support for this conceptualization may be found in a 
study of Minnesota Sexual Aberrations (Glueck, 1952-1955). Of the rap-
ists studied, 73 percent suffered moderate to severe anxiety after inter-
course, and 63 percent regarded women in a negative derogatory manner. 
The rapist showed little to no concern for their partner's sexual satis-
faction and a general lack of familiarity with .the patterns in female 
sexuality. Karpman (1954) states that overcoming the victim's resistance 
was an important component for many rapists. It allowed simultaneous 
expression of sexual control and hostility toward the woman victim. 
Fisher and Rivlin (1971) investigated the psychological needs of 
rapists by means of the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule. Rapists 
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as compared to adult males score higher on introspection, abasement, en-
durance, and heterosexuality. Rapists scored lower on autonomy, domi-
nance, and aggression. As compared with normal males, rapists thus tend 
to be less aggressive, less independent and self-motivated, and less 
self-assured and dominant. Fisher and Rivlin (1971) interpreted their 
results as consonant with rape as an act of hostility perpetuated by a 
male who feels weak, inadequate, and dependent. Additionally, Groth and 
Burgess (1977) studied 107 convicted rapists. They reported that during 
the attack 16 percent of the rapists became impotent, 3 percent ejacu-
lated prematurely, and 15 percent were unable to ejaculate or experienced 
great difficulty with ejaculation. Their report was supported by a 
follow-up survey of 92 women hospitalized after a sexual assault, nearly 
half of whom had no intervaginal sperm, including some women who had been 
gang raped (Groth & Burgess, 1977). 
Compared to any other type of sex offender, the overall personality 
structure of rapists is the closest to that of a non-offender. However, 
differences in impulse control and manifest aggression are noted between 
rapists and controls (Amir, 1971). The lack of felt mutuality in sexual 
conduct, disassociation of sexuality from love, and tendencies toward 
objectification of women are significant factors in the personality pro-
files of rapists. Indeed, the application of force may come to have 
definite sexual arousal potential for the rapist. Hodgens et al. (1972) 
explored the attitudes of convicted rapists in Victoria. Sexual inter-
course indicated that it was viewed solely as a physical act; females 
were seen to have no reason to refuse intercourse except due to fear of 
pregnancy. The act of forced intercourse was accepted as harmless as 
long as the victim was not "knocked around." 
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Other characteristics of rapists and rape behaviors have been noted 
by a variety of investigators. Cohen, Garofalo and Boucher (1971) dis-
tinguished among the differing motivations to rape. They noted that 
rape may involve expression of sexual, aggressive, or sex-aggressive 
behaviors. The sex-aggressive classification included instances of 
fused expression of sexual and aggressive drives. into an act of sadism. 
Of the 133 convicted rapists and 92 rape victims studied by Groth, 
Burgess and Holmstrom (1977), none was motivated by predominantly sexual 
needs. All of the offenses could be classified as either a power rape 
or an anger rape. The power rape is committed by a person who seeks con-
trol over the victim through the use of intimidation with a weapon, phy-
sical force, or threat of bodily harm. The anger rapist seeks the rape 
experience as a vehicle to express anger, rage, contempt, and hatred 
toward his victim by sexual assault, humiliation, degradation, and other 
forms of violence. In one experiment rapists could be experimentally 
separated from non-rapist subjects in that rapists developed penile erec-
tions to auditory stimuli of rape descriptions (Abel, Barlow, Blanchard 
& Guild, 1977). One theoretical explanation of the etiology of rape 
states that the man who commits rape comes from a family showing great 
parental friction, with a violent father abusing his wife (Bromberg, 
1965). The man-child learns by example that women may be safely abused 
and are a proper target for assault. The "feminine" personality trait 
cf passivity represents the greatest threat to perceived masculinity. 
Bromberg (1965) states that studies have revealed a "substratum of un-
conscious passivity" hidden behind an exaggerated or pretended masculin-
ity in persons convicted of violent crime. Thus, the fear of personal 
femininity compels the rapist to attack that which is most feared in 
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himself. This motivation, with an available vulnerable female target, 
propels exhibition of the behaviors either modeled by the abusive father 
figure or approved as masculine by the prevailing culture. 
D. Enculturation of Patterns of Violence 
Prisons may add to the causes of rape without contributing to a 
solution, particularly when psychological services are unavailable. 
Prison culture is an exaggeration of the general culture, with an empha-
sis on male sex roles, violence, and relations based on power (McDuff, 
Pernell & Saunders, 1977). Without therapeutic intervention, the con-
victed rapist is placed in a situation which aggravates and intensifies 
those very processes which contribute to the original rape syndrome. 
Recidivism rates for rapists after simple incarceration are high, sta-
bilizing at 35 percent in one reporting, while recidivism varied between 
6 and 35 percent under various treatment programs (Frisbie & Dondis, 
1965; Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, 1972). The recidivism rate for rape 
and aggressive sexual assault for the Victoria sample was 16 percent 
{Hodgens et al., 1972). Thus, simple removal from society through in-
carceration without treatment does not diminish the rapist's potential 
to seek repetitional rape gratifications. It may only further the encul-
turation of patterns of violence in persons already prone to violent, 
aggressive self-expression. 
An additional factor in the enculturation of patterns of violence is 
the contributory effect of media exposure. A study of women and minori-
ties in television performed by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights was 
particularly revealing in the patterns of crime, violence, and victimiza-
tion. Throughout the six years sampled, females were the most frequent 
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victims of violence (Fleming, 1977). Nonwhite females were more likely 
than any other group to be portrayed as victims rather than perpetrators 
of violence, and white females were the next most victimized group. 
White male characters were proportionately the most frequent inflictors 
of pain (18%), followed by nonwhite male groups (15.4%). Females in-
flicted pain on others much more rarely (7% of white females, 3.1% of 
nonwhite females). A similar pattern existed for killing. Males killed 
and females were killed; no nonwhite female killed and only 1 percent of 
white females were portrayed as killers. Thus, for the years from 1969 
to 1974 inclusive, the social patterning of violence in the media was 
predominantly with male perpetrators and female victims. A similar pat-
tern has been observed in society, according to the FBI (Uniform Crime 
Reports, 1973). In 1973, women accounted for 22 percent of the victims 
of committed homicides, and for 15 percent of those arrested for murder. 
For sex offenses other than rape or prostitution, only one in ten arrests 
are of women. 
American media provide much cultural support to violent solutions 
for personal and interpersonal problems, national and international prob-
lems. The trend toward victimization of the weaker person or nation is 
occasionally rejected as a valid solution. Serious consideration of the 
problem of interpersonal violence must focus upon not only the aggressors 
but also the aggressed. 
The fear of being raped--which every woman knows--has made 
women, collectively, the largest group of prisoners in 
America, sentenced to a lifelong deprivation of liberty by 
the frightening reality of sexual assault and by a sexist 
society and criminal justice system which require that the 
victim first establish her innocence before the rapist can 
be convicted (Robin, 1977, p. 136). 
E. Summary 
In summary, the two major psychological positions concerning rape 
are derived from either the Freudian view of the humanistic/feminist 
view. Freud's conceptualization included postulation of a masochistic 
female sexuality which readily accepts sexual assault from a male. 
Sexuality relies on fused sexual and aggressive energies in Freudian 
thought. The opposing position of humanism/feminism views rape as a 
means of female oppression. The feminist position emphasizes the im-
portance of such factors as encouragement of male aggressivity, patri-
archy, heterosexuality, and the cultural view of women as the property 
of males as contributing elements in the pattern of rape in the United 
States. 
Studies of rapists indicate that they differ from controls in im-
pulse control and manifest aggression. Rapists showed sexual arousal 
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to auditory rape descriptions and sadomasochistic material. Their sexu-
ality is disassociated from love considerations, and may be used as a 
vehicle to convey hostility and interpersonal control for women. 
Rape is one symptom of the encultruation of patterns of violence. 
Prison culture encourages violence and relationships based on power, and 
is unable to rehabilitate rapists without extensive therapeutic interven-
tion. The media portray women and minorities as frequent victims of 
violence, perpetrated usually by white males. In some groups, violent 
solutions to personal and interpersonal problems are increasingly being 
rejected as culturally valid, and a convenient index of change is the 
rape statistic. 
CHAPTER IV 
ATTITUDES REGARDING RAPE 
A. The Public 
A wide range of attitudes exists in the public concerning rape. 
These attitudes are often conflicting and highly emotional in nature. 
Yet, the attitudes held by the populace find their way eventually into 
legal codification. An example of the conflicted positions of liberal 
and conservative stances may be shown in an examination of resolutions 
submitted to the 1977 Oklahoma International Women's Year Conference 
(Darnell, Note 1). By way of explanation, the conference split into two 
factions, symbolized as differing stances on the Equal Rights Amendment 
(ERA). The ERA was not the only difference of opinion between the 
groups, however. Both groups were presented with resolutions derived 
from prior workshops. Thus, each group was presented with identical 
issues; resolutions of those issues proceeded very differently. Some 
of the resolutions from the workshop on rape were acceptable to both 
groups. Synopses of these mutually acceptable resolutions are presented 
as follows: 
1. Rape may be defined as an act of violence or force involving a 
sexual act in any degree. Both factions agreed to broadening the defini-
tion of rape to include any form of sexual assault. 
2. Additional training from qualified personnel should be obtained 
for persons who must deal with the victims of sexual assault. 
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3. Law enforcement agencies should employ a same-sex person to 
counsel with victims of sexual assault. 
The conservative body postponed, and the liberal caucus passed, a 
resolution lowering the age of statutory consent to 14 years. 
The following resolutions were passed by the liberals' caucus and 
defeated in the conservative body: 
1. Recognition that either partner of a marriage may be victim of 
rape; 
2. Provision of medical and legal assistance on a sliding scale 
and free evidence gathering in prosecution; 
3. Omission of the Hale instruction* in the courtroom; 
4. Revision of rape laws to provide for graduated degrees of the 
crime to apply to assault upon or by both sexes; 
5. Redefinition of the crime so that victims are under no greater 
legal handicap than victims of other crimes. 
A major point from these proceedings is that both liberals and con~ 
servatives were accepting a new definition of rape. Both groups recog-
nized rape as a crime involving any sexual act, not just the act of 
vaginal penetration. However, the conservative group was not interested 
in extending the rape law to cover marriage partners or to revitalize 
court procedures in the trial of rape cases. 
The National Women's Conference was held in Houston, Texas, 
November 18-21, 1977. The rape resolution passed by the august body 
*Some jurisdictions require the judge to instruct the jury immedi-
ately before deliberation in the manner prescribed by Lord Chief Justice 
Matthew Hale (1847): "Rape is an accusation easily to be made and hard 
to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though 
never so innocent" (p. 634). 
called for modification of the current legal requirements as follows 
("To Form~ More Perfect Union": Justice for American Women, 1978): 
Federal, state, and local governments should revise their 
criminal codes and case laws dealing with rape and related 
offenses to provide for graduated degrees of the crime with 
graduated penalties depending on the amount of force or 
coercion occurring with the activity; to apply to assault 
by or upon both sexes, including spouses of victims; to in-
clude all types of sexual assault against adults, including 
oral and anal contact and use of objects; to enlarge beyond 
traditional cormnon law concepts the circumstances under 
which the act will be considered to have occurred without 
the victim's consent; to specify that the past sexual con-
duct of the victim cannot be introduced (p. 598). 
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Women's groups are not the only ones concerned with the rape issue. 
Recently, many differing views concerning rape as a controversial issue 
have been aired. Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) found rape to be judged 
second only to murder in seriousness. A wide range of attitudes toward 
rape exists, and these attitudes reflect the influences of many other 
factors such as liberal-conservative stances, early socialization 
effects, sex-role identifications, and personal experiences. As these 
factors change, attitudes toward rape and rape victims also change. 
Recently, Louis Harris (1977) surveyed 1,536 adults nationwide con-
cerning rape and the law. Seventy-one percent of the sample rejected 
the idea that judicial decisions should excuse rape defendants because 
women often provoke men to commit sexual acts by the way they dress and 
act. A 51 percent majority felt that those judges responsible for the 
pronouncement should be relieved of the duties of office. An 87 percent 
majority felt that rapists are sick and perverted males who commit 
crimes against women from which women often cannot fully recover. A 
72 percent majority felt that rape of a woman is a violent crime and 
cannot be justified by suggesting that women who are raped brought it 
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on with the way they dress. A 57 percent majority felt that the atti-
tude of male judges, who released men charged with rape on the grounds 
that women spur the men on to rape them, indicates those judges have a 
deep bias and prejudice against women. A sex difference was noted on 
the previous item, with women endorsing it considerably more often than 
did men. By a 64 percent margin, people rejected the idea that in many 
cases of rape it was probably the woman who led the man on in the first 
place. 
The liberalization of public attitudes concerning rape has been 
profound. The woman, however, is still to some extent held responsible 
if she is raped. Again, according to Harris (1977), a 79 percent major-
ity still believe that any woman who hitchikes alone can expect to run 
the risk of having a man driving a car try to have sex with her or even 
rape her. A majority of 68 percent felt that some women carry on sexu-
ally and then get scared and unfairly call it rape. A 49 percent plural-
ity felt that with women appearing in advertisements in newspapers only 
scantily clad, with stories about prostitutes in the media, with bars 
that have nude dancing, and women dressing in revealing clothing, it is 
no wonder men think women want to carry on sexually. Each of the pre-
ceeding statements in some measure shifts the responsibility for rape 
back to the victim. A female hitchhiker is still considered fair game 
by the public majority. She is denied the right of mobility free from 
sexual harassment solely on the basis of her sexual 11 availability. 11 The 
suspicious attitude regarding unfair charges of rape is still prevalent. 
In light of the high statistics of non-reporting of committed rapes, an 
excessive fear of being unjustly accused seems excessively paranoid. 
And, regardless of the number of scantily-clad women in advertising, 
the idea that a woman may want to "carry on sexually" does not relate 
to the use of forceful rape to attain that end. The liberalization of 
attitudes concerning rape is only partially accomplished. 
B. Jurors' and Judges' Attitudes 
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Juries may dismiss rape charges on very nonlegal grounds. The pre-
sumptions and attitudes that a juror holds about rape may be the decid-
ing factor during balloting. A juror may differentially evaluate the 
effect of the complainant's emotional involvement according to prior 
attitudes. Rather than recognizing that much emotion can be generated 
by a criminal violation of one's own body, a juror may be more comfort-
able with assumptions of additional hidden motivating factors such as 
revenge or view the emotionality as "staged" for juror effect. Whatever 
the case, the juror is attributing nonrelevant characteristics or motiva-
tions to the victim which will prejudice the evaluation of her testimony. 
Attitudes denying the possibility of forcible rape, affirming that "any 
raped female must have asked for it," likewise prejudice a just ballot. 
The attitudes of the judge and jurors concerning rape is a major source 
of uncontrolled variability in the judicial proceeding. 
Jurors are screened by attorneys during the voir dire proceeding. 
The attorney is interested in getting a jury which will be sympathetic 
to his/her client. Perceived juror attitudes may be a deciding factor 
in the exercise of peremptory challenges in order to shape jury composi-
tion. For example, in three Florida counties, defense attorneys try to 
keep white women off juries for rape cases due to the belief that South-
ern white women are predisposed to convict for rape. Some prosecutors 
try to screen out black women since rape is so pervasive in the black 
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community that the black women may not consider it a crime (Astor, 1974). 
Some district attorneys do not want women on rape juries at all. They 
feel that women are more lenient than men in rape cases (Taylor, Note 6). 
Women are more concerned with the behavior of the victim than are men 
(Krulewitz, 1977). Women jurors are as concerned with the chastity of 
the victim as are men. Rape is a transgression against chastity, accord-
ing to the popular view. What follows logically from this is that an 
unchaste woman cannot be raped, i.e., she cannot lose what she does not 
have. The female juror may be willing to blame the victim for the rape. 
If the victim is held responsible, the other woman can continue to be-
lieve that "proper" behavior will protect them from a similar victimiza-
tion (Melani & Fodaski, 1974). 
Other attitudes regarding rape were tapped by Davis et al. (1975) in 
mock voir dire proceedings. Their subjects felt that rape was a diffi-
cult crime to commit. A significant sex effect was associated with the 
difficulty question, with males judging rape more difficult to commit 
than did females. Peripherally, their subjects felt that most rape 
charges are strongly justified, an attitude which is hard to reconcile 
with the low conviction rates obtained in rape trials. These subjects 
may have unwittingly tapped a contributory factor in the low conviction 
rate when a majority revealed that they felt the penalty for rape should 
be ten years or less. In many iurisdictions, such as the state of 
Oklahoma (Oklahoma Statutes, 1977), death or life sentences may still be 
imposed. 
Juries tend not to convict in rape prosecutions, even if corrobora-
tion is present (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). The jury does not limit itself 
to the issue of consent, as does the law. Of particular importance is 
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the victim's prior conduct. Any precipatory or provocative behavior 
on her part will probably result in the dismissal of the charge. Kalven 
and Zeisel (1966) based that conclusion on a scan of 108 rape cases in 
which jury bias was evident in cases involving "assumption of risk" by 
the victim. Juries given the option to convict the accused on a lesser 
charge preferred the lesser charge. If confronted with a matter of con-
viction for first-degree rape or acquittal, however, juries prefer to 
acquit the defendant. In aggravated rape, or rape involving overtbrutal-
ity, juries are more willing to convict the assailant. Judges disagreed 
with juror verdicts only 12 percent of the time in aggravated rape cases, 
as compared with a 60 percent disagreement rate with jury acquittal in 
non-aggravated rape cases (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). 
Krulewitz (1977) indicates that profeminist women are not swayed by 
the amount of force used in their amount of certainty that a rape was 
committed. Males' response patterns resembled that of profeminist women. 
Women who ascribed to traditional sex roles, however, exhibited a direct 
relation between amount of force used and certainty of rape commission. 
Judges as well as juries are operating under the attitudinal structures 
formed prior to the major cultural shifts following the women's movement. 
Women now have the need to work outside the home and need the mobility 
free of sexual harassment that has been denied. Not all judges ascribe 
to that view, as evidenced by Justice Lynn D. Compton as quoted by 
Ferrell in New West Magazine of August 29, 1977: 
if a woman hitchhikes alone "it would be reasonable" 
for the man who picks her up "to believe that the female 
would consent .to sexual relations"; by standing in need of 
a ride, she "advises all who pass that she is willing to 
enter the vehicle with anyone who stops," and that she "has 
less concern for the consequences than the average female" 
(p. 36). 
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Judge Arch Simonson (Pinsley, 1977) was recalled following a state-
ment that the rape of a 15 year old girl was a "normal reaction" to sexu-
al permissiveness within the society. Likewise, a Wisconsin judge gave 
a 16 year old girl a scolding because she had worn a sweat shirt and 
jeans to school and therefore had "enticed" the three boys who raped her 
in a stairwell into "doing what comes naturally"- (Ferrell, 1977). Juries 
and judges may exhibit such attitudes within a rape trial proceeding and 
thereby automatically bias the trial outcome. 
The impact of the judge's attitude on the trial proceeding assumes 
importance primarily in relation to the kinds of evidence he/she rules 
as admissible. The judge controls the amount of admissible evidence re-
lating to the victim's prior sexual conduct. An unsympathetic judge can 
allow prolonged and intensive examination of the victim's reputation for 
chastity, which often assumes excessive prejudicial and inflamatory 
importance to the jury. A more sympathetic judge may limit the introduc-
tion of such evidence. 
C. Penalties 
Judges tend to separate rape cases into three different categories 
with varying amounts of accorded credibility (Bohmer, 1974). One cate-
gory is the "genuine victim" involving primarily stranger-perpetrated 
rapes. This type tends to evoke a more sympathetic treatment from the 
)udge for the prosecutrix. Sentencing of the stranger-assailant upon 
conviction tends to be harsh. The second category of "consensual inter-
course" is rape according to the law, yet judges tend to treat it in a 
more cavalier fashion. They may view the complainant as in some sense 
implicated in the crime. Judges describe this situation as "friendly 
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rape," "felonious gallantry," and "assault with failure to please" 
(Bohmer, 1974, p. 305). These cases tend to show few convictions and 
mild penalties. The third category included "female vindictiveness" 
cases. Judges tended to believe that the intercourse was consensual or 
that the alleged rape did not occur at all. 
The judges' attitudes also affect the length and harshness of sen-
tencing convicted rapists. Judges in Australia tend to treat extensive 
injury to the victim and the prior moral conduct of the victim as impor-
tant factors to consider in sentencing the assailant (Barber, 1975). 
Less severe sentences were administered to assailants who raped single, 
non-virgin women, or women of other than good moral conduct. Juries 
share the judge's concern with the moral behavior of the victim. Con-
sistently, lesser sentences are imposed on the assailants of single, 
divorced, and non-virgin women. 
An investigation concerning appropriate penalties for rape was con-
ducted by Scroggs (1976). The dimensions of victim pregnancy, amount of 
provocation, and resistance were varied in experimental scenarios. The 
following results were obtained. Older subjects gave much higher penal-
ties if the victim was impregnated than did younger subjects. No sex 
differences regarding provocation by the victim were obtained. Provoca-
tion was regarded similarly by both male and female simulated judges, 
with both sexes assigning lower penalties for high provocation condi-
Lions. Large sex differences were obtained when victim resistance was 
considered. Males gave rapists lenient penalties when the victim did 
not resist, while females imposed more severe penalties under those 
conditions. Evidently, males assume that nonresistance constitutes im-
plied consent, whereas females view it as notification of helplessness 
and inappropriateness as a potential victim, Scroggs (1976) theorized. 
Given that over 50 percent of the victims studied by Arnir (1971) exhi-
bited submissive behavior in the face of rape, this may be a relevant 
factor in accounting for the low conviction rate in rape trials. 
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Scroggs (1976) obtained these differences in attitudes in simulated 
paradigms of both rape and robbery. Differences in patterns of responses 
were to some degree age-related as well as sex-related. The general con-
clusion seems to be that with a predominately older male jury, a non-
resisting victim will have difficulty convincing enough jurors to obtain 
a conviction. 
Smith et al. (1976) varied the dimensions of acquaintance and social 
role in an investigation of attributions of responsibility to a rape vic-
tim. They found that victims who were acquainted with their assailants 
were attributed varying amounts of responsibility depending on their 
social role. In other words, when acquaintance was a common factor, the 
nude dancer was attributed the most responsibility and the Catholic nun 
was attributed the least responsibility for becoming a rape victim. 
Acquainted victims were attributed more responsibility than were un-
acquainted victims. Two bases for responsibility were indicated. One 
was amount of provocative behavior and the other was carelessness. The 
specific pattern indicated by Smith et al. (1976) was as follows. In 
the acquainted condition, the assailant and the victim were seen as shar-
ing responsibility for the rape. The same pattern did not hold for the 
unacquainted condition. Subjects could resolve the responsibility 
dilemma by attributing responsibility to the assailant or to the victim. 
Subjects resolved it in the direction of attributing more responsibility 
to the victim, showing no differences in amount of responsibility to the 
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assailant regardless of acquainted or unacquainted variables. Sex dif-
ferences were obtained. Male subjects rated the rape victim as more 
careless and more likely to have done something to provoke the rape 
regardless of the victim's social role as nude dancer, social worker, or 
nun. Females identified more strongly with the victim and prescribed 
more severe punishment for the assailant than did the male subjects. 
Jones and Aronson (1973) found that more severe penalties will be 
assigned a rapist when his victim is married or virginal rather than 
divorced. The severest penalties were reserved for rapists of married 
females. Offenders whose victims are socially respectable are sentenced 
to longer terms of imprisonment, according to Landy and Aronson (1969). 
Racial factors may play a significant role in assignment of penalties. 
Wolfgang and Reidel (1973) reported that black males convicted of rape 
of a white female had an execution rate 18 times greater than any other 
defendant and victim racial combination. Simulation jurors' attitudes 
concerning rape may be quite representative of the attitudes held by 
actual jurors. The effect of attitudes within the judicial process 
takes on added importance when the rape trial is by jury. The jury be-
comes the final determiner of evidence and sometimes of penalties. 
Juror attitudes on rape may support or deny individual justice under the 
law. 
D. Summary 
A wide range of attitudes exists concerning rape and these attitudes 
eventually modify l~gal codes. Both liberal and conservative women's 
groups have begun to call for a new definition of rape, recognizing rape 
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as a crime involving any sexual act which is actualized without the con-
sent of the partners. 
The attitudes of judges and jurors have more immediately pressing 
significance since they affect the outcome of criminal trials. Attitudes 
affect the determination of witness credibility, the eventual findings, 
and the length and harshness of sentence. The attitudes of the judge and 
jurors is a major source of uncontrolled variability in the justice pro-
ceeding. 
CHAPTER V 
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHMENT 
OF THE CRIME OF RAPE 
The legal definition of rape has generally been forceful unlawful 
carnal knowledge of a woman by a man who is not her husband, accomp-
lished against her will or without her consent. Oklahoma law defines 
rape as follows: 
Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a 
female, not the wife of the perpetrator, under either of the 
following circumstances: 
1. Where the female is under the age of 16 years. 
2. Where the female is over the age of 16 years and 
under the age of 18, and of previous chaste or virtuous 
character. 
3. Where she is incapable through lunacy or any other 
unsoundness of mind, whether temporary or permanent, of giv-
ing legal consent. 
4. Where she resists but her resistance is overcome by 
force and violence. 
5. Where she is prevented from resistance by threats 
of immediate and great bodily harm, accompanied by apparent 
power of execution. 
6. Where she is prevented from resisting by an intoxi-
cating narcotic, or anesthetic agent, administered by or 
with the privity of the accused. 
7. Where she is at the time unconscious of the nature 
of the act and this is known to the accused. 
8. Where she submits under the belief that the person 
committing the act is her husband, and this belief is in-
duced by artifice, pretense and concealment practiced by the 
accused, or by the accused in collusion with her husband 
with the intent to induce such belief. And in all cases of 
collusion between the accused and the husband of the female, 
to accomplish such act, both the husband and the accused 
shall be deemed guilty of rape (Oklahoma Statutes, 1971). 
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The four necessary components as stated above can be summarized as 
follows: the victim is female; nonconsent is clearly exhibited; the 
victim is overwhelmed by force or threat of harm; and the male perpetra-
tor achieves forcible vaginal penetration. 
A much narrower working definition of rape is used by the public 
and the police. The tendency of the police is to view forced sex as 
rape only if an immediately reported rape involves a violent stranger 
who leaves the evidence that an attack took place over the woman's 
active resistance (Weis & Borges, 1973). Police prefer to investigate 
the assault of victims who are clearly chaste or without fault. Rape 
complaints that are considered barely credible by police are filed as 
"investigation of persons" (Brownmiller, 1975); when the victim is a 
"suitable victim" the rape may be listed as a "no human involved" inves-
tigation (Ellison, Note 3). Women who belong to a racial minority or 
are of low socio-economic status or of questionable chastity are the 
groups held to be "suitable victims." Since a large area is left to 
police discretion, a large percentage of rape complaints are dismissed 
as "unfounded claims" solely on the basis of victim characteristics. 
The officers to whom a rape is reported should bear a special 
responsibility to the victim. The victim of a sexual assault, unlike 
victims of other forms of assault or violation, must cope with the 
social conditioning against open discussion of sexuality and sexual acts 
as well as internal fears and guilts supported by society through incor-
rect beliefs about rape. If a woman is raped, the public view is that 
she must be "bad" and probably she "asked for it." She may be guilty 
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of an error in logistics or guilty of error in becoming vulnerable to 
an assailant, yet no woman asks to be raped. Her consent alone would 
prevent any requested act from satisfying the concept and definition of 
rape. For instance, women and men may consent to sadomasochistic sexual 
practices in which violence and bodily harm will occur, yet rape has not 
occurred. Mutual consent precludes the possibility of violation of one 
partner. Yet the victim of sexual assault is not accorded the validity 
of her complaint, which in turn affects the potential outcome of the 
complaint. 
The negative and suspicious attitude exhibited by some police 
officers has the effect of discouraging the victim from pursuing charges 
against her assailant. Even if she has reported the rape, she may be 
dissuaded from filing charges or may fail to provide information vital 
to investigation of the complaint. A study of the sex crime analysis 
unit of the New York Police Department revealed that 66.5 percent of 
dismissed cases were caused by complaint failure of the type noted above 
(Keefe & O'Reilly, 1975). The assumption is made that victims fail to 
press complaints because of the treatment they receive from the legal 
authorities. The most common victim complaints concerning treatment by 
police officers were: (l) inappropriate questioning of a personal 
nature; (2) judgmental attitudes regarding the victim's physical appear-
ance, attire, or actions which are regarded as precipitating the sex 
crime; (3) rudeness and aggressiveness; (4) unsympathetic attitudes; and 
(5) failure to clarify procedures in the court, hospital and police sta-
tion. After positive attitude training, an increase of 24.8 percent 
arrests for forcible rape was effected, due largely t.o better investiga-
tions resulting from greater complaint cooperation. 
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There are problems with the public attitudes regarding rape. 
Generally, the average citizen is ignorant concerning the nature of rape. 
From a questionnaire administered to college students, Schultz and 
De Savage (1975) indicated that 41 percent of all females and 55 percent 
of all males surveyed incorrectly defined legal rape. Of added import-
ance is that 12 percent of a non-aggressed female group (those who had 
never experienced an actual or attempted rape) stated that there is no 
such thing as forcible rape. This belief would be an automatic prejudi-
cial element which could affect verdicts in jury trials of rape cases. 
Various qualifications of charges of rape are in force in different 
jurisdictions. A review source, Rape, by Silberstang (1972) was most 
helpful in compilation of the legal requirements concerning rape. Com-
plete legal references may be found in the appended legal reference 
section. 
A. Statutory Rape 
The legal system recognizes that the crime of common-law rape may 
be committed on any female. If she is below the statutory age limit for 
knowledgable consent, her assailant may be prosecuted for statutory rape 
rather than forcible rape. Some states require evidence of previous 
chastity of the victim even in statutory rape proceedings (Hickman vs. 
State; State vs. Walker; State vs. Higgenbotham). The complexity arises 
in that statutory rape provisions remove the possibility of consent as a 
defense. In the face of a requirement for prior chastity, however, the 
victim's history of chastity becomes challengable in court. The import-
ance of the chastity of the victim is in relation to the probability of 
consent. In consent cases of rape, if the prosecutrix is near the legal 
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age of consent, evidence of previous unchastity may be used as a defense 
(Dallas vs. State). If the issue of consent is not raised, prior unchas-
tity is not a defense to a charge of forcible rape (Roper vs. State). 
Prior chastity may be presumed until disproven in some courts (Carpenter 
vs. Commonwealth; Commonwealth vs. Bonomo), while in others chastity must 
be established by the state as would any other element of a case (Dallas 
vs. State; State vs. Kelly; Wright vs. State). 
B. Forcible Rape 
For non-statutory rape proceedings, prior unchaste conduct by the 
prosecutrix is no defense. Unchaste conduct does have an effect on the 
case, particularly when it is a jury proceeding. Jury members tend to 
weigh evidence of prior unchaste conduct by the victim in excess of its 
expected importance. Regardless of the charge of law, conviction of a 
rapist who assaults an unchaste woman is virtually impossible by a jury 
trial (Barber, 1975). Legally, introduction of evidence of prior speci-
fic acts of immorality involving the prosecutrix is inadmissible (People 
vs. Collins; State vs. Kain; State vs. Chapman; State vs. Allen). Evi-
dence of prior unchastity is generally of the form of proof that the 
prosecutrix had intercourse with another man or men (State vs. Wood; 
People vs. Merrill; Holland vs. Commonwealth; People vs. Hornbeck) in 
order to imply that the prosecutrix would not be as likely to resist the 
defendant's advances as would a more chaste woman (Lee vs. State; 
Packineau vs. U.S.). 
If the defense of consent is offered, the prosecutrix's general 
reputation for immorality and unchastity prior to the alleged rape may 
be introduced (Holland vs. Commonwealth; People vs. Eilers; People vs. 
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Allen; State vs. Franklin; People vs. Collins; Waller vs. State; State 
vs. Taylor). Clarification of this rule in People vs. Whitfield stated 
that evidence relating to prior chastity and specific acts with the 
defendant was admissible. The court held that inadmissible evidence in-
cluded sexual activities of the defendant with third persons, specific 
instances of the victim's sexual conduct, and opinion and reputation of 
the victim's sexual conduct. The practice of admitting the sexual his-
tory of the prosecutrix as relevant testimony has been intended to re-
flect on her probability of consent in a given situation. Evidence of 
prior recent unchaste acts may give rise to an inference of consent but 
not to a presumption of law of consent (People vs. Shape). Any woman or 
female child may refuse consent and become the victim of rape. Legal 
precedent has been set to recognize that any woman, including "unchaste" 
women and prostitutes, may become the victims of this crime of sexual 
aggression (State vs. Borde; Humphreys vs. State; Harper vs. State; 
Haynes vs. State). No matter ·what she may have done in the past, a 
woman does not lose her right of choice in each sexual encounter, to 
refuse consent or to consent as an act of her own will. 
One of the suggestions for reform of the rape laws suggests that 
rape as a special category should be eliminated {Baril & Couchman, 1976). 
Since the rape statutes specify that female sexual organs are violated, 
those statutes are redundant. Existing sexual abuse statutes cover the 
violation of sexual organs but without specifying the gender violated. 
Rape statutes specifying a female victim thus composes a redundant cate-
gory of violation. Instead of protecting females as persons, rape 
statutes serve as a legal chastity belt to control females as the proper-
ty of males. As seen in other discussions, the females who cannot find 
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legal redress for their victimization under the current situation be-
cause they are in some way held to be "acceptable victims" would be able 
to seek redress under a system in which the violation rather than the 
victim's characteristics was the issue. 
Practically speaking, not all victims of sexual aggression are 
female. Males are also subject to rape, yet their assailants are charged 
with violation of some type of sodomy or illegal carnal knowledge statute 
(Brinson vs. State). A survey of college males indicated that 20 percent 
reported at least one incident of forcible rape; an additional 10 percent 
had experienced a forcible sodomy attempt (Schultz & De Savage, 1975). 
Sexual assault appears to be a more pervasive problem than has been 
recognized. Focusing only on male assailants and female victims obscures 
the fact that violent sexual assault may happen to anyone. 
Rape has been argued to be an act perpetrated by one sex on another 
sex where pregnancy can occur, while carnal knowledge encompasses experi-
ences of another person's body (Washington vs. State) and could apply to 
either sex. Forcible penetration of a man's bodily orifice against his 
will by the sexual organ of another man constitutes forcible carnal know-
ledge (Brinson vs. State). Standards similar to those used in rape cases 
are applied to sodomy charges with the exception of consent. The argu-
ment that no criminal offense arises from consensual acts may have some 
validity, yet most states are unconcerned with the consent in the sodomy 
prosecutions. Sodomy is an act deemed offensive in the state law, not 
dependent on the reception or willingness of the partner. Without a 
legal presumption of even the likelihood of consent, force may be more 
easily proven. Even when the testimony of the complaining witness 
lacked credibility, a sodomy conviction was upheld due to the presence 
43 
of bruises on the witness's neck and back after the incident (People vs. 
Mules). This constitutes a less stringent standard than that applied in 
rape prosecutions, as may be shown by the corroboration requirements for 
rape of a female victim. 
Males may be violated by females as well as by other males. Rape 
crisis centers are now receiving legitimate calls from males that have 
been violently sexually assaulted by'one or more females (Dolittle, 
1977). The situation may be slightly easier to examine given a female 
assailant and a male victim. Due to the biology inherent in the situa-
tion, those acts intended to humiliate and degrade the victim may be 
partially distinguished from those acts aimed at deriving sexual pleasure 
from the victim. With a male assailant and a female victim, often the 
two factors are inseparably merged. Yet the end result is the same in 
both cases. The victim has been victimized. 
At one point in time, when the concept that women could rape men 
was revolutionary, theorists were inclined to distinguish the result of 
the violation on a sex basis. In a footnote, Herschberger (1948, p. 20) 
discusses the following: "If we regard ordinary rape as a form of 
'intervaginal masturbation,' woman's 'rape' of man would be 'extravaginal 
masturbation.' While she could not effect intromission, she could effect 
orgasm." In the text, she continues the thought: "While a woman might 
'rape' a man in a highly mechanical fashion, though no less mechanical 
a fashion ·than the male type of assault, she could not humiliate him 
thereby." 
Personal testi~ony from males who have been raped by females or by 
other males tends to refute the idea that sexual assault is not humili-
ating to the male victim. In one rape of a man by three women, the 
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victim was forced at knife point to anal intercourse with a wine bottle 
followed by forced cunnilingus. At no point in the proceedings did he 
report responding with pleasurable sexual arousal. His responses were 
remarkably similar to that of female victims, including shame, guilt, 
rage, humiliation, fearfulness, and self-doubt (Dolittle, Note 2). 
Prosecution for offenses such as these is rare. A man who charges 
a woman with rape faces a virtually impossible task. Most rape and 
sodomy statutes only cover sexual assault with a male as principle. The 
complainant must face social abuse as to his "loss of masculinity" and 
his complaint probably will be treated as an envious joke. Like many 
raped women, the victim may only want to forget the entire episode. The 
experience of rape is demoralizing, regardless of the sex of the assail-
ant or victim. 
In summary, forcible rape statutes differ in the specified legal 
requirements. In non-statutory rape proceedings, prior unchaste conduct 
by the victim may give rise to an inference of consent in the present 
trial situation. 
Existing rape statutes specify that the victim must be female. 
Males are also raped, yet their assailants are charged with violation of 
some type of sodomy, illegal carnal knowledge, or sexual abuse statute. 
Rape statutes could be reformed to include both male and female victims 
and male and female assailants in order to have uniformity of protection 
and evidentiary requirements. 
c. Nonconsent 
The characteristic which distinguishes rape from intercourse is the 
element of nonconsent. If one partner is unwilling to participate in 
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any sexual act and communicates that unwillingness, the other partner is 
obligated to honor that assertion. If he/she does not do so, it can be 
considered rape. The requirement to prove that the victim did not con-
sent to the perpetration of the crime is a unique requirement in charges 
of rape. It is the only crime in which the victim must prove that she 
did not in any way, even subconsciously, consent to be victimized. 
Two elements are of legal importance. First, the initial unwill-
ingness of one partner to perform some sexual act must exist; legally, 
to exhibit nonconsent to the act of vaginal penetration. Second, sub-
jective knowledge of unwillingness is not legally significant unless 
nonconsent is communicated to the partner. After the communication the 
partner chooses for himself, as an exercise of will, whether or not to 
heed the assertion. In a relationship of trust and mutuality, the asser-
tion will be honored regardless of the influence of factors such as the 
relative strengths of the two, the amount and kind of vulnerability, the 
intrapsychic meaning of the specific act, or other situational or person-
al variables. In an objectifying relationship, wherein one partner is 
accorded less innate value than the other, these factors may assume more 
importance than the "mere" objection of one partner. With the right 
combination of circumstance coupled with the inclination to violate 
another's rights to refuse consent, the situation in which rape may 
occur has been created. 
Legally, nonconsent must satisfy several criteria. Subjective un-
willingness alone is insufficient to establish nonconsent. Resistance 
is a sign of nonconsent (Killingswoth vs. State). Active resistance is 
the strongest affirmation of nonconsent for a jury. The jury decides a 
woman's state of mind mainly from her behavior in establishing_ nonconsent. 
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Physical resistance to the utmost is not required in cases where 
further resistance would be foolhardy or would endanger the woman. The 
question of how much resistance for how long must be resolved by each 
individual victim. Courts and juries decide the nature of appropriate 
resistance after the fact and in a situation in which the danger is no 
longer present. Guidelines for resistance vary across time and jurisdic-
tions. Some recent rulings have modified the older requirement of ut-
most, unceasing resistance (Prokop vs. State; State vs. Schmear). Most 
jurisdictions now hold that the amount of resistance must be proportional 
to the situation, including such factors as relative strength of the vic-
tim and assailant and the futility of persistance in resistance (Harris 
vs. State). The assailant's threats of physical harm to the victim may 
also suffice to establish nonconsent. 
The law does not require useless or impossible resistance and 
recognizes that overcoming the victim's will to resist by force is possi-
ble. For instance, in one case a black eye and a bloody nose received 
prior to intercourse were sufficient to dissuade the victim from an 
excess of further resistance (Dumar vs. State). Presence of multiple 
attackers severely mitigates the amount of required resistance. 
The courts have held that continued resistance to attempted rape 
is not required to establish nonconsent (State vs. Glidden), and that a 
rape victim need not continue resistance where such resistance would be 
futile (People vs. Sullivan). An armed assailant is one such example 
of a situation in which further resistance becomes futile. When a vic-
tim's life is endangered by an assailant armed with a deadly weapon, 
such as a knife (People vs. Garriott), or when the victim was forced to 
comply at gunpoint (People vs. Browder), further resistance has been 
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held to be justifiably futile. Occasionally, a woman is successful in 
frustrating the attack through her resistance. Her attacker may then be 
convicted of attempted rape (People vs. Hamil}. The threat or danger to 
the woman need not even be objectively present in certain cases. For 
example, in one instance resistance was not required due to the defend-
ant's use of a real-looking water pistol (Brown vs. State}. The implica-
tion of threat was sufficient to justify cessation of resistance. A 
similar circumstance occurs when a rape is committed with the aid of an 
unloaded gun. 
The victim need not resist when certain other factors are involved. 
One conviction for rape was upheld even though there was no evidence of 
outcry, no corroboration, and no evidence of use of force. According to 
testimony, the assailant covered the victim's face and threatened to kill 
her baby (People vs. Nichols}. Yet, the victim is constrained to use as 
resistance any advantage or opportunity which is presented. One convic-
tion was reversed due to the victim's failure to cry out as she was 
forced across a busy street during daylight (People vs. Anderson}. 
One difficulty with a case in which an armed assailant causes the 
woman to cease active resistance is that the rape has a higher likeli-
hood of being disbelieved. Without visible marks of injury incurred 
during resistance, many police officers are reluctant to investigate the 
charge. If the assailant succeeds in disposing of the weapon prior to 
capture, nonconsent and the use of force are exceedingly difficult to 
prove. 
If consent is given any time prior to penetration, no rape has been 
legally committed (People vs. De Frates; Hazel vs. State; Rogers vs. 
State}. Yet, consent must be distinguished from submission. Force or 
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threat producting fear beyond the capacity of the victim to endure may 
produce submission. Any consent by the victim which is induced by fear 
of violence or harm is not legal consent (State vs. Carthens). Often 
the jury must decide whether the victim gave a last-minute consent or 
merely submitted in the face of superior force. If the woman gives her 
consent after the assault but before penetration, her assailant may be 
convicted of assault with intent to ravish (Copeland vs. State). The 
consent given before penetration annuls the possibility of conviction 
for forcible rape. Once penetration has been accomplished, the time 
for the question of consent has passed. It is not legally possible to 
consent after the act of penetration. 
Often legal definitions are not synonymous with cultural prescrip-
tions. Communication of consent or nonconsent is difficult to establish 
verbally and near impossible non-verbally. Sex differences in methods 
of communication of consent compound the situation. College students, 
particularly females but also the males, indicate that the lack of re-
sistance to increasing degrees of sexually intimate play signifies con-
sent (Schultz and De Savage, 1975). Other popular cues for consent 
included a clear verbal consent and, particularly for the males, the 
behavioral "consent" of the female reciprocating fondling of the male's 
erotic zones. Lack of resistance is a passive method for assuming con-
sent. Encouragement of passivity is one of the hallmarks of female 
socialization. Thus, the socialization process has created a class of 
rape victims whose precipitating "behavior" is a lack of active resist-
ance. The enculturation of attitudes such as they may help explain why 
an additional element required in some jurisdictions in rape cases is 
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active resistance on the part of the victim (People vs. Mazworth; State 
vs. Dizon; People vs. Smith). Resistance serves to establish both the 
u5~ of force and nonconsent. 
~1e i~~ue of consent has been decided differently under differing 
circumstances. For example, in England in April of 1975, the highest 
court of criminal appeal, ·the House of Lords, held that if an accused 
believed that the woman was consenting, whether or not that belief was 
based on reasonable grounds, he could not be found guilty of rape 
(Curley, 1976). The ruling is referred to as "the Morgan rule," and, 
in the press, as the "rapists' charter." The case concerned a man who 
invited his buddies to share the bed of his wife, without her consent. 
H~ had told them that she would enjoy the experience, even though she 
might simulate resistance. She filed suit against all four of the 
of:f~nding parties. The abolishment of the standard of "reasonableness" 
con~titutes a major departure for English precedent. It is a matter 
for conjecture as to how the case would have been decided if it had con-
cerned assault, robbery, or any other form of violent crime instead of 
merely a gang-rape. 
In summary, the characteristic whi9h distinguishes rape from inter-
course i$ the element of nonconsent. The nonconsent must be communicated 
clearly, verbally and behaviorally, to the assailant. Active physical 
resistance is the clearest affirmation of nonconsent for a jury. Utmost 
resistance i~ not required when it is foolhardy or would endanger the 
woman. Most jurisdictions hold that resistance should be proportional 
to the situation. Consent must be distinguished from submission on the 
part of the victim. Force or threat producing fear beyond the capacity 
so 
of the victim to endure may produce submission, which is not legal con-
sent. Consent is not legally possible after the act of penetration. 
D. Force or Threat of Harm 
One of the primary ways to establish nonconsent to a sexual act is 
to determine whether the assailant achieved his purpose through the use 
of force. It is not a legal requirement that the force be actual physi-
cal force. Any form of fear, fright, or coercion through threat or 
injury is a form of force. Threat with a weapon constitutes the use of 
force. 
Fear of bodily harm can create a situation in which a woman fails 
to resist her attacker. Some states require that the threat of force is 
sufficient to cause death or serious bodily injury (State vs. Howard). 
In other states, reasonable fear of bodily harm (Fields vs. State), a 
threat of serious bodily harm (State vs. Burns), or fear of violence 
(State vs. Armstrong) are sufficient to satisfy legal constraints to 
negate any consent given and constitutes the requisite force for a rape 
charge. 'l'he victim need not trust in the assurances of her assailant. 
She is under no obligation to believe that he will not in fact penetrate 
her (People vs. Bissonnette; People vs. Hamil). His verbal assurances 
are directly countermanded by his use of force in the sexual assault. 
Failure to achieve penetration does require a charge of attempted rather 
than forcible rape. 
A charge of assault with intent to commit rape includes all of the 
elements of rape with the exception of consummation (Todd vs. State; 
Hogue vs. State). One who handles or takes hold of a woman with the 
intent of forcible carnal knowledge against her will and resistance 
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(Poole vs. State; State vs. Brown; State vs. Burnette; State vs. LaVine) 
is guilty of assault with intent to commit rape. The offense is com-
pleted when there is assault with intent, regardless of whether penetra-
tion or rape is then attempted (Griffin vs. State). Intent is a 
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difficult element to establish legally. Such elements as the preliminary 
conduct of the assailant are important. In one case the defendant told 
the victim of his intent, displaced her clothes, and hit her. The court 
affirmed his conviction of assault with intent even though he had not 
yet exposed himself (Charles vs. State). Testimony from other sources 
may aid in establishing intent. Existence of a repeatedly executed plan 
of operations helps to establish intent to rape rather than an intention 
to obtain a consensual form of sexual gratification (State vs. Hampton). 
Frustration in the completion of the act is no defense (Griffin vs. 
State). 
What is the likelihood that a victim of sexual assault will actually 
come to harm? Astor (1974) reported the following: Philadelphia General 
Hospital found 36 percent of the victims are assaulted in addition to the 
rape. In New York, about 50 percent of the women raped are brutally 
assaulted. Amir (1971) reported that about 30 percent of the victims re-
ceived brutal beatings or choking, with an additional 50 percent "beaten, 
not brutally," i.e., not requiring immediate hospitalization. These 
figures do not include women murdered by their assailants. Determined 
resistance may end in death for the victim. One out of every ten female 
murder victims is killed during rape or other sexual assault (Russell & 
Van de Ven, 1976). The Rape Emergency Assistance League reported in 
1974 that one in every ten women raped in San Diego County was murdered 
and three in every ten were mutilated (Caldwell, 1976). It has been 
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established that at least 400 rape-murders are committed in the United 
States every year (Brownmiller, 1975). Fear of death, a very reasonable 
fear given the statistics, is a powerful factor affecting the amount of 
offered resistance. Yet even submission is no guarantee of release. The 
man who panics after the rape, the man who wishes to make detection and 
capture less likely, and the rarer sadistic sociopath who requires death 
and/or mutilation of the victim for sexual satisfaction kill regardless 
of the victim's resistance or lack of resistance. An assailant with no 
respect for a woman's right to her body may well have little respect for 
her life. It has been said that the only crime with more longlasting 
effects than rape is murder (Taylor, Note 6). For many women, the 
crimes have become inexorably and permanently linked. 
In summary, the use of force by the assailant is a primary method 
for the establishment of nonconsent. Any form of fear, fright, or coer-
cion through threat or injury is a form of force. Percentages of women 
who are harmed beyond the rape itself range from 21 to 50 percent, not 
including the numbers of women who are murdered by their assailant. It 
has been estimated that 400 rape-murders occur each year in the United 
States. 
E. Vaginal Penetration 
Penetration of the female sex organs by the male sex organ is the 
legally recognized form of rape (Martine vs. People; People vs. Reynolds; 
State vs. Kendrick; Jones vs. State; State vs. Hines). Penetration of 
the vulva, no matter how slight, is required; anal penetration alone 
will not satisfy a rape charge (State vs. Jackson). Rupture of the 
hymen is unnecessary since penetration of the labia suffices (Williams 
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vs. State). Emission without penetration is not rape (Woolridge vs. 
State). Presence of spermatozoa is not a requirement (Lynch vs. State). 
Since proof of rape requires proof of vaginal penetration, a physician 
is normally the proper witness to attest to vaginal penetration (People 
vs. Kirkdoll) • 
Husbands cannot be directly charged with rape of their wives (Sharp 
vs. State, People vs. Pizzura; Duggins vs. State). The marriage contract 
presumes the consent of the woman to make herself sexually available to 
her husband. Husbands, however, do rape. A husband cannot be charged 
unless he violates some provision other than a "mere" accomplished rape 
of his wife. If he aids and abets another man in the rape of his own 
wife, he is legally held to be guilty as the perpetrator of the crime 
(State vs. Martin). Separation will not suffice to remove the privilege 
of intercourse on demand (Frazier vs. State); instead, a divorce is re-
quired to dissolve a wife's legal bondage. 
In State vs. Bateman, the court dismissed charges against a husband 
of anal intercourse and forced fellatio. The court noted that how a 
couple privately conducted their sexual practices within marriage was 
constitutionally protected and concluded that fellatio and anal inter-
course between private consenting adults were private sexual activities. 
Consent was not considered to be a defense. Many questions may arise 
from this ruling. If fellation and anal intercourse are acceptable be-
tween consenting adults, why is consent not a viable defense? Has the 
issue of the wife's desire for protection from unwanted sexual congress 
and unwanted sexual_practices.actually been addressed? Has the legal fic-
tion of the two becoming one after marriage, and that one the husband, 
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created a situation in which wives may be freely victimized by those very 
males to whom the wives' trust is surrendere~? 
Questions such as these are addressed rather differently by women 
and by the legal system. Some of the women have begun to lobby for 
change in the rape laws. One desired change is the inclusion of husbands 
as parties to whom the rape laws would extend (Gilson, 1976). 
F. Corroboration 
In the past, corroboration has been required for the various ele-
ments of a rape. New York in 1967 required that evidence other than the 
word of the victim be produced to verify force or lack of consent, pene-
tration, and identity of the assailant (People vs. Linzy). The New York 
requirement of identity corroboration was rescinded in 1973 (Goldstein, 
1973). Astor (1974) states that these requirements of evidence beyond 
the testimony of the complainant rest on three assumptions: (1) the women 
will falsely charge rape for revenge or other reasons; (2) males fear 
that the charge of rape is so heinous that juries will be predisposed to 
convict; and (3) the difficulty of proof as to whether the act was con-
senting intercourse or forcible rape. All of these assumptions favor the 
defendant. But the assumptions may not all bear equal validity. The 
New York Sex Crimes Analysis Unit asserted that only 2 percent of the 
reported cases were found to be false (quoted in Astor, 1974); the FBI 
Uniform Crime Reports (1975) lists as a national average 15 percent of 
the reported rapes classified as unfounded, although this figure does 
not differentiate between false accusations and unprosecutable cases. 
However, 73 percent of the rapes in the misdemeanor category were 
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dismissed either because the victim had failed to appear or dropped the 
charge. 
Corroboration requirements call for additional evidence that tends 
to support the word of the witness. Direct corroboration such as an 
eyewitness is rarely available. Eyewitnesses were present in only 4 
percent of the rape cases studied by Kalven and .Zeisel (1966). Circum-
stantial evidence is admissible and may include such things as heard 
screams, damage to the victim's bodi, clothes, or environment; finger-
prints; medical evidence and testimony; promptness of complaint to 
friends or police; presence of blood or semen on the victim's body, lack 
of reason to submit falsified charges; testimony relating to the victim's 
emotional condition; evidence of breaking and entering of the victim's 
home or property; conduct of the accused at the time of arrest; opportun-
ity for the accused to commit the crime as charged (Allison vs. u.s., 
1969); or other evidence which supports the complainant's story. Corro-
borative evidence does not prove that an event transpired as alleged; it 
merely establishes a probability that the event could have occurred as 
alleged. Rape is the only violent crime requiring corroboration. The 
requirement of corroboration may be a more stringent standard that is 
not applied in other types of cases. Corroboration is often required 
for the offenses of perjury, treason, or accessory to a crime. Difficul-
ties inherent in corroboration requirements have been noted. One diffi-
culty with corroboration is that an armed and an unarmed assailant must 
expend different amounts of force and, therefore, leave different amounts 
of ready corroborational evidence. An unarmed assailant may expend con-
siderable force in subduing a victim. A woman facing a weapon, a gang 
of rapists, or other forms of overwhelming coercion may not actively 
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resist due to fear for her life. Indirect corroboration becomes exceed-
ingly difficult to attain in convincing form without evidence of force. 
Corroboration requirements do not allow introduction of evidence of other 
sex crimes of the defendant occurring in the past or with a different 
victim, unless it aids in confirmation of the accused's identity. 
From a legal perspective, corroboration has been established through 
introduction of at least one of the following: 
l. Similarity of circumstances (in Re G., 1972); 
2. Evidence of similar conduct by the defendant (State vs. Arnold); 
3. Circumstantial evidence (State vs. Polson, State vs. Smith); 
4. Circumstantial evidence from minor victims (U.S. vs. Jones, 
State vs. Grady) or involving minor assailants (In Interest of Williams); 
5. Medical evidence (State vs. Anderson; Robinson vs. State, Luna 
vs. State); 
6. Extrinsic circumstances (State vs. Ferguson); 
7. Surrounding circumstances (People vs. Porter); 
8. Photographs such as those of sexual acts between one defendant 
and his daughter (People vs. Byrnes); or 
9. A combination of direct and circumstantial evidence (State vs. 
Goodrich; Lynch vs. State). 
Corroboration may not be required, depending on local statute re-
quirements, if the victimis testimony is clear and convincing (People 
vs. Kincaid; State vs. Williams). The corroborational evidence takes on 
added significance when the victim failed to make prompt complaint 
(State vs. Fisher). Failure of the victim to make an outcry or prompt 
report without corroborational evidence must be explained for considera-
tion by the jury (Villareal vs. State). 
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Other forms of corroboration have included character evidence and 
psychiatric evidence. Character evidence coucerning the complainant 
serves to divert the jury's attention from the alleged assault to the 
complainant's history of conduct (Complainant credibility, 1973). 
Psychiatric evidence may be used in a wider application to impeach the 
complainant's credibility. Note was taken in People vs. Cowles that the 
victim was a "pathological falsifier, a nymphomaniac, and a sexual per-
vert" (p. 431). Negative psychiatric testimony can completely destroy 
the victim's credibility. 
A thorny problem from both the legal and psychological perspective 
involves the impeachment of witnesses in sex cases. An exceedingly fine 
boundary exists between protection of the rights of the accused and vio-
lation of the rights of the victim. The evolution of rules governing 
admissibility of evidence has generally taken a suspicious view of the 
female victim. Of historical interest is a statement from Machtinger 
(1949): "It is quite apparent that the circumstances of a sex case are 
unique in that the charge often stems from the mental traits of the 
prosecuting witness" (p. 754). 
Machtinger (1949) discusses the situation for the admission of 
psychiatric testimony for the impeachment of the prosecuting witnesses 
in sex cases. Two types of evidence are available to the court: the 
community judgment of the reputation of the witness, and evidence of 
specific instances of misconduct. 
Competency of the prosecuting witness is cer-tified if she has 
the ability to observe, recollect, and communicate the essen-
tials about which she is called to testify, with accuracy 
sufficient to make the testimony correspond to knowledge and 
recollection and if she appreciates the nature and obligation 
of the oath, or more correctly, obligation to tell the truth 
(p. 753). 
Machtinger would like to see included in the evidence available to the 
court in sex cases the opinions of psychiatrists, social workers, and 
probation officers concerning the moral and mental traits of the com-
plaining witness. Such "evidence" is currently inadmissible under the 
opinion rule. Cited as worthwhile procedent was an Oklahoma case for 
rape of a minor in which the court allowed the opinions of physicians 
as to the character of the victim as a "nymphomaniac" who was "guilty 
of such depraved moral practices as to make her unworthy of belief" 
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(p. 752). The rape conviction eventually was affirmed since the prose-
cution was able to introduce a medical witness who affirmed that the 
prosecuting witness was in fact a normal girl (Miller vs. State). 
The preceding information may serve to highlight the dangers of vir-
tually unregulated testimony aimed at witness impeachment. The conflict 
between testimonies of defense-called and prosecution-called psychia-
trists is a long-standing legal joke. Trained professionals differ on 
their evaluative opinions of the same witness. If such unqualified per-
sons as social workers and probation officers are allowed to·introduce 
personal opinions into the judicial proceeding in order to impeach victim 
credibility, far fewer convictions would be obtained. 
The suspiciousness exhibited toward the complaining witness in a 
sex offense case is but one instance of legal sexism. Other aspects of 
this pervasive problem include differential administration of physical 
examinations, differential detention policies, and variations between 
self-report and official versions of female delinquency (Klein, 1973). 
Sexism is prevalent in the treatment accorded the youthful female 
offender. Nearly 75 percent of underage females as compared with less 
than 30 percent of underage males are arrested for "status offenses" 
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such as promiscuity, bad behavior, or running away from home (Cohen, 
1977). Once in the criminal justice system, such offenders are more 
likely to be detained and held longer even though they have not commit-
ted any criminal offense. "The offense of most of the young women going 
before the courts was nonconformity to a social model of what is accepted 
behavior for young girls," says Judge Lisa Richette of the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas (Cohen, 1977). In the face of such differential 
treatment accorded offenders before the bar, to make the process of seek-
ing legal redress for the rape victim more difficult through institute-
ment of unlimited credibility impeachment appears both unnecessary and 
unjust. 
G. Rights of the Accused 
In order to provide protection to those accused of rape, care must 
be taken not to abrogate their civil rights (Sagarin, 1975). A distinc-
tion must be amde between protection of the rights of the accused and 
consideration of the rights of the victim since they are so intimately 
related. Within the trial proceeding psychological factors operate to 
the benefit of both the prosecution and the defense. At the start of 
the trial, the defense has a "presumption of innocence," i.e., the de-
fendant is presumed to be innocent of the crime as charged until the 
prosecution implicates the defendant "beyond a reasonable doubt." Con-
versely, the prosecution benefits from two psychological factors. First, 
"the People of the State of Oklahoma" charge the defendant with the com-
mission of crimes from which the public must be protected. Second, the 
juror may believe at the beginning of the trial that the State would not 
go to the trouble of prosecution in this age of plea-bargaining unless 
the defendant is guilty as charged (Toch, 1961). 
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Protection of the rights of the accused cannot occur at.the expense 
of the rights of the victim. As indicated earlier, corroboration re-
quirements favor the defendant. Currently, within the legal system, the 
accusation of the victim is viewed with suspiciousness. Various defenses 
shift the trial emphasis from the defendant to the victim. A defense of 
"false accusation" provokes examination of the victim's mental health and 
prior sexual history. A defense of "consensual intercourse" permits the 
cross-examination of the victim in the area of prior sexual practices. A 
defense of "mistaken identity" may be used in a rape case as well as 
other crimes. Corroboration of the defendant's alibi will be required. 
The perpetrator of a rape usually is seen at close range by the victim. 
However, women may psychologically block out memories surrounding the 
violation; thus, later there may be difficulty in positively identifying 
the assailant (Pagano, 1976). 
Fair guidelines for probes of the victim's sexual history have been 
difficult, if not impossible, to establish. The 1977 International 
Women's Year Conference passed a resolution on rape which suggested com-
plete abolishment of the current practice of admission of evidence con-
cerning the victim's past sexual history. The Oklahoma Statute which 
limits admission of evidence and cross-examination of the victim regard-
ing sexual conduct in prosecutions for rape and attempted rape was held 
to be constitutional in Cameron vs. State. The defendant is legally 
protected from such biasing probes of his past conduct, even where such 
conduct established a history of sex crimes. Many jurisdictions now 
require revelation of the defendant's and the victim's prior relationship 
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as well as her general reputation for chastity (People vs. Whitfield). 
This may free the victim from unlicensed probing of her complete sexual 
history. Relevancy of evidence is still a matter of the judge's discre-
tion, however, and violations of the victim's right to privacy still 
permeate the legal proceeding. 
The problem of proving lack of consent and providing corroborative 
evidence produce an unduly harsh requirement for the victim. These re-
quirements were intended to protect the accused from false charges. The 
victim of other forms of assault is not required to produce witnesses to 
the crime or sustain bodily harm to prove lack of consent. In order to 
more justly recognize both the rights of the accused and the victim, the 
proposed Federal Criminal Code Reform Act (S.l) recommends elimination 
of the corroboration requirement. The Judiciary Committee has considered 
both the victim's right to privacy and the accused's rights and concludes 
the following: "Although questions of credibility in rape cases are com-
monly critical, there seems no reason why the traditional protection of 
the reasonable doubt standard is not adequate to safeguard the rights of 
the accused" (U.S. Senate, Judiciary Committee, p. 598). In light of the 
Morgan decision in England (Curley, 1976) abolishing the standard of rea-
sonableness of belief in consent, care must be taken in America in order 
to avoid a similar ruling. "Reasonable doubt" and "reasonable belief" 
are the heart of the reasonable standard of justice for both offenders 
and victims. 
H. Summary 
In summary, penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex 
organ is the current legal requirements for the establishment of the 
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crime of forcible rape. Husbands cannot, at present, be charged for the 
rape of their wives due to the presumption of consent carried in the 
marriage contract. Corroboration requirements call for the presentation 
of evidence which tends to support the word of the complaining witness. 
Any legitimate evidence which establishes the probability that an event 
could have transpired as alleged may be introduced. Rape is the only 
violent crime which requires corroboration, and this places an additional 
burden on the victim. The exact corroborational evidence required varies 
across jurisdictions, and may not be required if the victim made prompt 
complaint and is able to testify clearly and convincingly. Care must be 




Court procedure has been designed to facilitate the administration 
of justice. The judge, jury, and attorneys are an interrelated system 
with different functions. The function of the court is to determine 
which laws are applicable to the current case and to instruct the jury. 
The jury is charged with the responsibility of determining the facts of 
a case and applying the law to the given evidence. The attorneys adopt 
an adversary role and attempt to present the case as favorably as is 
possible for their side. 
A. The Jury 
One way in which attorneys aid in the favorable presentation of 
their case is through the voir dire examinations of potential jurors. 
Vior dire simply means "to tell the truth." The voir dire examination 
has three functions according to Tach (1961) • The first is to select 
jurors that are favorable to the defense or prosecution, depending on 
which counsel is doing the examining. Juror backgrounds are a vital 
element in a trial. Jury expert Hans Zeisel says, "The composition of a 
jury has as much to do with the outcome of a trial as does the evidence 
itself" (Yuen, 1977, p. 47). Use of voter ltsts alone as a source for 
jurors discriminates against nonvoters such as the poor, the young, the 
minorities, and women. This gives the prosecution a built-in advantage 
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and may require defendants to prove their innocence which, by law, should 
be presumed until contradicted. 
The second function is to create a favorable atmosphere for the 
further presentation of the case. The third function is to sensitize 
the jurors to problems with which the opposing counsel must deal. Counsel 
for either side may excuse any juror who possesses attitudes prejudicial 
to that side. The lawyers are provided an unlimited number of challenges 
"for cause" and a limited number of peremptory challenges which permit 
excuse of any juror without having to give a specific reason for doing do. 
Challenges used most often are peremptory challenges in order not to 
alienate jurors who may be similar to the juror excused "for cause." 
Attorneys often exercise their right to peremptory challenges during 
jury selection to excuse obviously biased or prejudiced jurors. They 
frequently rely on intuition and logic in selecting which jurors to ex-
elude. Rape trials present particular difficulties in jury selection. An 
unbiased jury is fairly easy to obtain for other crimes, but most people 
have a prior attitudinal structure concerning sexual matters which influ-
ences their jury service. Jurors probably begin listening to testimony 
with an attitudinal pattern already in effect. One criminal defense 
attorney addresses the issue of jury selection in the following manner: 
I want people on the jury that have never had a rape happen 
to them. I want to know if anyone in their family has ever 
been victimized in this way. Since all women are potential 
victims, I am uneasy with any women serving on a rape jury. 
Of course, you get men like me who want to see the "rapo" 
put away before they assault my wife or children next. What 
I mostly want is a fair and impartial jury. I settle for an 
attentive jury (Thomas, Note 7). 
Any attorney can select as he/she sees fit because case variables 
will be presented differently to different juries. Any demographic or 
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descriptive data of the jurors can be effectively used by a defense or 
prosecution attorney. Many attorneys prepare their presentations to the 
average or representative local jury. 
B. Aim of Deliberations 
One of the primary ways that simulated juries differ from actual 
criminal juries is in the deliberation process. Most of the literature 
surveyed attempted to. arrive at projected verdicts based on the pooling 
of individual juror judgments. This presents spurious results since de-
liberation has effects on judgment far beyond any singular process of 
decision-making. The deliberation process has a two-fold aim. One is 
the exchange and evaluation of information by all persons involved. The 
second aim is to arrive at a consensus. Within this framework, many 
influences play in shaping the final verdict: the composition of the 
jury, the effectiveness of the foreman, participation rates of individual 
members, and the special effect of group deliberation, among others. 
The composition of the jury tends to be somewhat random concerning 
the characteristics of individual members. Juries are generally selected 
from the rolls of registered local voters. Sole proprietors of business-
es, handicapped persons, persons under medical care, persons aged 65 years 
and older, and persons for whom jury service is an excessive hardship may 
be excused. Additionally; jurors may be excused by prosecution or defense 
attorneys during voir dire. 
Some research has examined the process of deliberation. Since the 
direct study of actual trial juries is not legally possible, researchers 
must utilize a variety of groups operating under similar group processes. 
For instance, Hare (1952) researched interaction and consensus in varied 
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size groups of Boy Scouts. Some similarities with jury processes may 
be observed. With juries, each member would feel internally compelled 
to present any agreeing or disagreeing sentiment directly to the group. 
The doctrine of the conscientious juror (Harris, 1972) suggests that 
members of a jury will consider the arguments advanced by any member, 
and will outvote the minority only after due deliberation. As long as 
individuals have a chance to present ideas in a group discussion, they 
are generally satisfied with the results of that discussion, even if 
those ideas are not accepted. A concern noted by Hare (1952) was that 
with a twelve-member group, interaction among members may be limited by 
the participants feeling that their individual opinions are not important 
enough to be presented to the group. Hopefully, the doctrine of the 
conscientious juror prevents stifled discussion in a judicial setting. 
A factor which influences rates of juror participation in the delib-
erations is the status of a juror. Evidence indicates that higher status 
persons participate significantly more often in the deliberation process 
(Strodtbeck & Mann, 1956). Males and persons of high status occupations 
have higher rates of participation, more influence, greater satisfaction, 
and more perceived competence in jury deliberations than do women and 
persons of low status occupations (Strodtbeck, James, & Hawkins, 1957). 
Strodtbeck et al. (1957) also noted that the comments of higher status 
males are perceived to have greater value. Jury members expect that the 
foreman will be a male of higher occupational status. 
Both gender and status have been shown to have an impact on delib-
erations. A juror's gender influences the amount of juror participation 
in discussions. This trend has been diminishing, however. In more recent 
investigations both male and female jurors are seen to be equalizing their 
67 
respective rates of participation. Strodtbeck and Mann (1956) reported 
the relative rates of verbal discussion by gender as 61 percent for males 
and 39 percent for females. In 1959, James reported the average verbal 
contribution by individual jurors was 9 percent, with individual female 
jurors contributing 7 percent. By 1967, females and males were contrib-
uting about equally to jury deliberation proceedings (Simon, 1967). The 
causes of the change in relative contributions over the years may only be 
speculated, although a salient factor may well be the changing roles of 
both men and women in America. 
Amount of participation is not the only gender-related issue during 
deliberation. Males and females may differ in their patterns of communi-
cation. According to an analysis by Strodtbeck and Mann (1956), males 
initiated longs bursts of acts aimed at task resolution, whereas females 
tended to react more to the statements of others. These sex differences 
in patterns of communication may be of particular importance in deliber-
ations. Bray (1974) found that all female juries followeda.process which 
resulted in fewer hung juries and fewer guilty verdicts. The basis of 
this verdict outcome is unclear--different sex roles, factors of evidence, 
or differences in communication patterns are potential influencing fac-
tors. Further investigations may be required to determine the general-
izability of Bray's results. 
C. Jury Foreman 
One member of the jury will be elected foreman. His/her function is 
to assume responsibility for the execution of the deliberations. From a 
content analysis of the foreman's contributions during discussion, 
Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins (1957) concluded that the foreman tends to 
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assume a regulatory role during deliberations. Persons in authority tend 
to be.respected and to some extent deferred to by other members of the 
group. The foreman's contributions may be accorded more value than the 
contributions of certain other members, or may be overly valued only in 
the area of regulatory matters. The persons most likely to be selected 
foreman are high status males. Strodtbeck, James, and Hawkins (1957) 
point out that only one fifth the number of women foremen that would be 
expected by chance were actually selected. Davis et al. (1975) reported 
that 71 percent of the student jurors were male, yet 82 percent of the 
elected foremen were male. This tends to support the conclusion of 
Maccoby and Jacklin that in adult mixed groups ". formal leadership 
tends to go to males in the initial phases of interaction. . " (Cox, 
1976, p. 107). 
D. Jury Decision Alternatives 
The decision rules imposed on a jury do affect the outcomes in terms 
of the probability of conviction. A defendant with 80 percent apparent 
guilt statistically is eight times more likely to be convicted with a 
requirement of 10 out of 12 convinced jurors, while those of 90 percent 
apparent guilt under the same decision rule will be convicted three times 
more often (Friedman, 1972). The apparently innocent defendant will not 
be convicted, regardless of the decision rule. Those defendants with 
prior arrest records or poor defense, lending credence to the appearance 
of guilt, will be convicted more often under the majority decision rules 
as opposed to the unanimity rules. 
Verdicts are not appreciably altered by a majority rule as contrasted 
with a unanimity rule (Nemeth, 1977). Experimental unanimity groups 
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differed from majority groups in that they were more likely to continue 
deliberations until full consensus was reached and individual jurors felt 
that justice had actually been administered. A hung decision was reached 
more often with groups operating under a unanimity rule. Majority rules 
may serve to decrease the robustness of the conflict during deliberations 
and may impede the ability of the minority faction to persuade the major-
ity. The only defendants adversely affected by a majority rule are the 
apparently guilty defendants who have convinced too few jurors of a 
reasonable doubt of their guilt. 
Verdicts may be altered by the stipulated sentence the law may im-
pose on the defendant upon conviction. If the jury is not in charge of 
sentencing or must impose a sentence "too harsh" for the crime as charged, 
it may refuse to convict an apparently guilty defendant. This occurs due 
to restriction of decision alternatives as a real world jury phenomenon. 
When a jury is instructed to bring in a verdict of not guilty or guilty in 
a specified degree with a conjoint "too severe" penalty, the jurors will 
tend to bring in a verdict of not guilty. In a simulated robbery-murder 
trial, jurors with an option of a moderate penalty seldom brought in a not 
guilty verdict, whereas those jurors without such a option acquitted the 
defendant 54 percent of the time (Vidmar, 1972). Thus, research evidence 
suggests that lowering the penalty for rape convictions to a reasonable 
sentence provided for by graduated degrees of charged sexual assault with 
sraduated penalties would probably result in a higher rate of convictions. 
E. Leniency Shift 
Izzett and Leginski (1974) demonstrated that group discussion tended 
to produce a leniency shift that eliminated the initial differences in 
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sentencing tendencies for individual jurors, at least for the unattractive 
defendant. Myers and Kaplan (Note 5) found that group deliberations pol-
arized the mean judgments given by individual jurors. The effect of a 
two-and-a-half minute deliberation was to shift the mean judgment in low 
guilt cases to significantly less guilty and to form a correspondent shift 
in high guilt cases. A trend for a concurrent shift in sentencing was ob-
served, although that trend did not attain significance. A similar pro-
cess was observed by Davis (1973), who noted an initial skewed individual 
distribution under a majority rule. 
Davis et al. (1975) found a 22 percent conviction vote from individ-
ual jurors in an adapted version of an actual rape case, but no jury 
deliberating the case brought in a guilty verdict. In the Bray (1974) 
experiment, females initially favored conviction in a rape case signifi-
cantly more often than did males. No significant differences were obtain-
ed, however, in the jury decisions. This serves to illustrate the dangers 
in generalizing from juror decision schemes to jury paradigms. The effect 
of initial differences in amount of judged guilt seems to be a contribut-
ing rather than determining influence in the consensus seeking jury 
process. 
Individuals gave a significantly higher leniency proportion of 
guilty verdicts than do juries in some situations (Davis et al., 1975~­
Gleason & Harris, 1976). The leniency shift may be a factor of importance 
to a defendant in the decision of selection of trial by judge or trial by 
jury. Rumsey (1976) also notes that a shift toward leniency after discus-
sion raises the possibility that jury deliberations may favor the defen-
dant. The leniency shift effect appears to hold in a wide variety of 
psycho-legalistic situations, and could be effectively used by the 
marginal apparently-guilty defendant. 
The process of deliberation must eventuate in a verdict. Jurors 
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do not always behave as the doctrine of the conscientious juror would 
dictate. The eventual verdict is determined by the factors of each 
individual juror's conclusion as to the relative likelihood of guilt or 
innocence and modified by the discussion process. The deliberation pro-
cess appears to be the method by which a consensus is ultimately reached, 
although the end result tends to coincide with the initial majority posi-
tion. Kalven and Zeisel (1966) have concluded that the jury verdict is 
substantially determined by the initial juror majority. Most verdicts are 
arrived at individually in the courtroom (Weld & Danzig, 1940). The 
jurors make their decisions somewhere in the judicial proceeding, not 
necessarily waiting until after all the facts are heard or until the 
group discusses the issue during deliberations. 
F. Summary 
The court system is composed of interrelated parts with different 
functions. The court determines applicable laws, the jury determines the 
facts of the case and applies the law, and the attorneys try to present a 
case favorable for their client. Jury selection in rape trials presents 
particular difficulties because jurors enter the trial with an attitudinal 
system concerning sexual matters in effect. Jury deliberations present 
the opportunity for jurors to exchange and evaluate information and aid in 
arriving at a consensus. Influences which shape the final verdict include 
the composition of the jury, the effectiveness of the foreman, participa-
tion rates of individual members, and the special leniency shift following 
group deliberation. The decision rule in effect, requiring unanimity 
or simply majority, and the statutory harshness of the penalty upon 
conviction may also affect the obtained verdict. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND EXTRANEOUS VARIABLES 
A. Gender Differences 
Certain differences between the behaviors of male and female 
subject-jurors have been observed by a variety of investigators. These 
differences are not uniformly consistent across jurors or jucicial situ-
ations. Indeed, as Strodtbeck and Mann (1956) noted: "It is only in 
the statistical analysis of aggregates of acts that the sex-typed conno~ 
tation emerges" (p. 3). Extreme caution should be used in interpretation 
of gender differences reported in judicial research, because prior inves-
tigations in the area of gender differences observed in judicial judg-
ments have relied for their data base on simulation jury trials or on 
averages of individual judgments. 
Research has indicated that gender differences sometimes exist, but 
with little regularity or consistency. Nemeth, Endicott and Wachtler 
(1976) found no consistent evidence for the belief that male and female 
jurors in a traditional courtroom setting differ with regard to sympathy 
for the defendant, persuasibility, or passivity. Nagel and Weitzman 
(1972) found that each gender favors its own in amounts of money awarded 
in civil trials. Each gender also tends to give lower penalties to its 
own members (Rose & Prell, 1955). Consistency of gender differences 
found in sex crime cases has been shown to be modified by other vari-
ables. For instance, Simon (1967) found that housewives were more 
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punitive toward the defendant than were male jurors in an incest case; 
however, working women's judgments resembled the male jurors' verdict. 
Gender differences may be of particular importance for the criminal 
charge of rape. Generally, a confused pattern of differential sentenc-
ing, differential preferences in assigning guilt, and varying lengths 
of parole eligibility have been found in various investigations. For 
instance, gender differences in guilt preferences have been observed 
under certain conditions (Bray, 1974; Davis et al., 1975; Efram, 1974; 
Sealy & Cornish, 1973) and not under others (Griffitt & Jackson, 1973; 
Sealy & Cornish, 1973). Gender differences have been observed in deli-
beration styles by some investigators (Strodtbeck & Mann, 1956) and not 
by others (Nemeth, Endicott & Wachtler, 1976). 
A similar pattern of gender differences has been observed in sen-
tencing. No statistically significant effect of gender-differences was 
observed in sentencing by subject-jurors in several studies (Jones & 
Aronsen, 1973; Landy & Aronson, 1969; Richey & Fichter, 1969). No ex-
planation was offered in one case reporting a gender difference in sen-
tencing (Griffitt & Jackson, 1973). In another investigation, male 
jurors tended to give longer sentences when the defendant's background 
was varied; female jurors gave longer sentences when remorse was manipu-
lated (Rumsey, 1976). 
Gender differences may be obtained even in some cases involving 
the same type of criminal charges. For instance, in one study involving 
a negligent homicide case, female jurors tended to impose longer sen-
tences and harsher sentences (Griffitt & Jackson, 1973). In another 
study utilizing a negligent homicide paradigm, no gender differences 
were foUnd (Landy & Aronson, 1969). 
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Gender differences have been observed in cases dealing with rape. 
These types of gender differences among juro~s may be the result of indi-
vidual attitudinal structures, patterns of communication, role and status 
considerations, or a variety of other individual differences. In one 
investigation of a mock jury, male subjects perceived rape to be more 
difficult to commit than did female subjects (Bray, 1974). All subjects 
who served thought that rape charges were slightly justified in the re-
corded trial scenario. All female juries, however, followed a process 
that resulted in fewer hung juries and more not guilty verdicts than did 
all male juries. Mixed male/female juries' verdicts converged (Bray, 
1974). In contradiction of the above finding, Smith et al. (1976) found 
that female jurors gave higher sentences for rape than did male jurors. 
In addition, male subjects rated the victim as careless and likely to 
have provoked the rape. Females tended to identify with the victim. In 
a non-rape experimental content, Taylor and Epstein (1976) found that 
female subjects are significantly more aggressive than are male subjects 
toward male defendants. Thus, if females consider rape a serious crime, 
their impeded conviction rate is difficult to interpret. 
The gender difference effect may be due in part to the influence of 
variables other than sex. For instance, in addition to gender differ-
ences, L'Armand and Pepitone (1977) found significant gender differences 
in length of recommended sentences based on the variables of the victim's 
prior sexual history. The amount of corroboration variable was not sta-
tistically significant. Rape between strangers was the most severely 
punished (mean = 13.54 years sentenced) and rape of a "dating promiscuous 
woman" was the least severely punished (mean= 4.5 years). Additionally, 
ratings of the seriousness of the crime and amount of inflicted damage to 
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the woman were good predictors of length of recommended sentences. These 
findings assume legal implications in that the majority of rapes occur 
between acquainted persons (Amir, 1971; Brownmiller, 1975; Hayman et al., 
1968). Male subjects recommended shorter sentences in all rape scenarios 
involving previous acquaintances. Female subjects recommended sentences 
proportional to the previous relationship and previous consensual inter-
course, and did not respond on the basis of any one condition variation. 
A study of male and female juror ratings of various dimensions of 
intent, outcome, and pain in rape scenarios found differential patterns 
of "judicial" response (Heim, Malamuth & Feshbach, 1977). Females were 
more responsive to the effects of outcome and pain, while males were 
more concerned with intent. Females assigned more·guilt and punishment; 
and generally were more punitive when the rape was previously planned. 
Males punished unintentional rapes more than intentional rapes: a find-
ing which is difficult to explain. Male subjects did differentiate be-
tween these conditions, in general ascribing less guilt, shorter 
sentences and lower sentences, particular for intentional rapes. This 
finding, although isolated, has implications for the criminal justice 
system. Some essential items include that the gender of the juror may 
influence which pieces of information presented as evidence are deemed 
salient. Clear gender differences are found in amount of perceived 
guilt and length of imposed sentence. Males seem to derogate the victim, 
although this process of derogation is subtle. Male jurors, therefore, 
are more likely to hold the victim responsible for the crime, to dispense 
fewer guilty verdicts, and to recommend shorter sentences upon convic-
tion. 
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A related finding examines gender differences in moralism and puni-
tiveness (Richey & Fichter, 1969). They surveyed male and female sub-
jects on two simulated offenses: cheating on an exam and possession of 
marijuana. They found that both genders prescribed similar punishment 
for males, but that males prescribed less severe punishment for females. 
A double standard may not operate to the benefit of a female rape 
victim. Women are as severe at attributing fault to the victim of a 
rape as men (Jones & Aronson, 1973). This result has been interpreted 
according to attribution theory: "When a victim is someone who does not 
intrinsically merit suffering, that is, someone who is 'respectable,' 
jurors will find it necessary to attribute behavioral responsibility to 
the victim in order to justify her suffering" (Jones & Aronson, 1973, p. 
419). In this case, the double standard has become a double bind. If 
the victim is respectable, then she must be derogated and suspected of 
collusion in the crime. If the victim is not respectable, then she is 
presumed to have consented and is suspected of collusion in the crime. 
For many victims, the jury trial constitutes a no-win situation. 
In summary, gender difference investigations of the behavior of 
male and female jurors have relied on simulation juries or on averages 
of individual judgments. A confused pattern of differential sentencing, 
differential preferences in assigning guilt, and varying harshness of 
imposed sentences have been reported in various investigations. Gender 
~ifferences are particularly marked in experimental paradigms of rape 
cases, although they may be due in part to the influence of variables 
other than gender. In general, male jurors ascribe less guilt and 
shorter sentences for rapists than do female jurors. The difference may 
be due to differential identification of jurors with either the assailant 
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or victim and to differential attributions concerning causality and re-
sponsibility. 
B. Jury Verdict 
The jury is charged with the task of determining the facts and then 
applying the law to each particular case. Juries are generally composed 
of local citizens. Weld and Danzig (1940) noted that several extraneous 
variables which influence jurors are testimony, opening and closing 
statements of counsel, personalities of witnesses, and personalities of 
the counsel. They reveal that personal standards are brought by the 
jurors into the trial, and under some conditions jurors may decide the 
case irrelevant of the law. The jury may base its decision on factors 
such as the relative weight assigned to the different witnesses' testi-
monies or on the basis of inadmissible evidence. Different witnesses 
may sway juries in different directions on the basis of their personal 
characteristics. The interpersonal variables of attractiveness and simi-
larity may operate to make one witness more "believable" than the other 
witness. 
1. Gender of Witness 
An additional consideration at this point is that rape is the only 
crime in which the defendant is consistently male and the claimant is 
consistently female. Many crimes are heard by juries in which the issue 
boils down to "which witness is the more credible." Rape cases are the 
only legal charge in which it is consistently his word against hers. 
Essential to an understanding of the full impact of this is that people 
tend to value contributions of males higher than those of females 
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(Goldberg, 1968). Males tend to automatically be accorded more status 
and influence, even within juries (Strodtbeck, James & Hawkins, 1957). 
The female victim is facing a culturally biased situation. The defense 
counsel will attempt to discredit her as a witness, including but not 
limited to besmirchment of her reputation for chastity. The jury will 
tend to evaluate her testimony more negatively than the defendant's 
solely because she is female. 
2. Inadmissible Evidence 
The jury may base its decision on inadmissible evidence. Informa-
tion which comes to the jury from sources other than the admissible 
courtroom proceedings may effect the verdict. Influence may result from 
information about the defendant's or victim's character, demographic 
information such as socio-economic status, personal history, or pretrial 
publicity. Sue, Smith and Gilbert (1974) found that damaging, relevant 
pretrial publicity was utilized by female but not male subjects to reach 
a guilty verdict more frequently. A similar finding using a rape trial 
paradigm was observed by Hoiberg and Stires (1973). Even though the two 
studies agree, the interpretation is still unclear whether female jurors 
are affected more than male jurors by biasing pretrial publicity or 
whether the significant differences are concerned with gender differences 
in the area of rape trials. 
According to Hoffman and Bradley (1952), simulated juries seem to 
ignore judges' instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence. They 
further found that juries tend to disregard the rules of law and decide 
cases on the basis of a few commonly remembered points of evidence. Yet 
the judges' instructions to disregard certain points of inadmissible 
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evidence are followed by some jurors. In two separate trials, jurors 
disregarded information about previous convictions of the defendant 
(Sealy & Cornish, 1973b). The individual jurors may exercise their own 
discretion in practice about when to ignore or follow the judges' in-
structions about admissibility. Inadmissible evidence is a decisive 
factor when the admissible case is weak (Sue, Smith & Caldwell, 1973). 
Obviously the judge's instructions to the jury to ignore certain evidence 
is not equivalent to a situation where the evidence violates the spirit 
of the judicial proceeding. The untenable alternative to the jury is to 
acquit a defendant on a technicality or to refuse to convict an apparently 
guilty defendant regardless of the law. 
3. Pretrial Publicity 
The effect of pretrial publicity on guilt attributions was investi-
gated by Hoiberg and Stires (1973) in a simulated rape-murder paradigm. 
Heinousness (manipulated by the presentation of lurid details of the 
rape-murder) and prejudgment (manipulated by varying the implication that 
the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime) were varied. The results 
obtained suggested that high heinousness and high prejudgment increased 
the tendency of low intelligence female jurors to conclude after hearing 
the trial evidence that the defendant was guilty as charged. Neither 
dimension significantly influenced the guilt verdicts of male jurors. 
Boiberg and Stires (1973) discussed possible reasons for the female sub-
jects' greater vulnerability. They indicated that the female jurors 
identified significantly less with the victim than did male jurors. 
Female jurors rated the crime as significantly less heinous than did 
male jurors. These results contradict a hedonic-relevance hypothesis 
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in favor of a position of victim differentiation. In other words, 
female jurors may have sought means to differentiate themselves from the 
victim and to subjectively minimize the gravity of her fate. Hoiberg 
{Note 4) indicated that defensive strategies aimed at maintaining the 
illusion of a just world tend to be most strongly elicited by injustice 
suffered by persons like oneself, e.g., in this case, females. The fe-
males' rating of the crime as less heinous than the males' ratings possi-
bly indicat~es the operation of defensive minimization. Defensive 
minimization operates to maintain a just world paradigm by reducing or 
minimizing the incongruity between the victim's fate and considerations 
of personal worth. In any case, female jurors derogated the victim and 
minimized the gravity of her fate, a finding of potential importance in 
actual trial situations. 
4. Sex-Role Identification 
In a study of the functions of sex-role identifications, Lipsett< 
and Strodtbeck {1967) conducted a simulated trial in which the defendant 
was ascribed the trait of homosexuality. The verdicts of the simulated 
jurors varied along the lines of sex-role identification. The jurors 
were categorized in terms of overt and covert masculine and feminine 
characteristics by way of their scores on two tests of masculinity-
femininity, the Franck Drawing Completion Test (Franck & Rosen, 1949) 
and the Gough Femininity Scale (Gough, 1952). Male subjects who were 
overtly masculine and covertly feminine identified were more likely to 
find a homosexual defendant guilty of a charge of treason. Male subjects 
who were both overtly and covertly feminine identified were more likely 
to find the defendant not guilty. Male subjects who were both overtly 
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and covertly masculine identified varied the least in terms of the ver-
dict, generally confining their conclusion to the issue of treason 
itself. The variability of results,which a dichotomy of conscious and 
unconscious sex-role identification suggests is possible, underscores 
the importance of this variable in sex-related trial investigations. 
5. Interpersonal Attraction 
The effect of extraneous influences may be to result in a verdict 
based not on the legal merits of a case, but rather on the basis of 
spurious information. Additionally, it may show its influence in the 
length and harshness of imposed sentences or penalties. Some factors 
which have mediated the length of imposed sentences are.attractiveness 
of the defendant, amount of manifest remorse, socio-economic status, 
social stability, and race. 
Judges and juries often differ on the trial prescriptions, often 
based on the jury's sensitivity to some defendant characteristic. Kalven 
and Zeisel (1966) have documented that judges and juries often differ in 
their verdicts, as often as in one-third of the cases analyzed. Part of 
the disagreements stemmed from the effect of jurors' personal attitudes 
prompted by a feeling for the defendant. Experimentally, mean sentences 
for unattractive defendants are longer than for attractive defendants 
(Landy & Aronson, 1969; Sigal! & Landy, 1972). Generally, when the vic-
tim is viewed positively by the jurors, the defendant will tend to 
receive a longer sentence (Landy & Aronson, 1969). However, attractive 
victims may be differentially perceived by jurors solely on the basis of 
their interpersonal attraction. Physical attractiveness energizes a 
complex of attitudes commonly held about the attractive person. These 
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attitudinal complexes often relate specifically to the gender of the 
attractive person. For example, attractive women are preceived as more 
sociable, heterosexually alluring, professionally successful, and person-
ally happy than unattractive women (Dermer & Thiel, 1975). Additionally, 
they are expected to be more conceited, more likely to engage in adul-
tery, and be more bourgeois than less attractive women. As Dermer and 
Thiel (1975) note, the more attractive women may have the greater diffi-
culty prosecuting a rapist or seeking acquittal on prostitution charges. 
She would fare better if she were the defendant rather than the victim. 
6. Socio-Economic Status 
Other extraneous influences on verdicts have been documented. For 
instance, the amount of manifest defendant remorse mediates, to some ex-
tent, the length of imposed sentence (Rumsey, 1976). Socio-economic 
status (SES), which is a composite of variables such as income, educa-
tion, and residence, does not always predictably affect judicial outcome. 
A low SES defendant tends to be judged as more blameworthy by a jury 
(Gleason & Harris, 1976). Background of the defendant did not signifi-
cantly mitigate length of imposed sentence in one experimental study; in 
fact, sentences for low SES defendants tended to be longer than sentences 
imposed on higher SES (upper-middle class) subjects (Rumsey, 1976). De-
fendants described positively in terms of social stability tended to have 
shorter sentences. When the victim is viewed positively, the defendant 
will be more severely sentenced (Landy & Aronson, 1969). Gordon and 
Jacobs (1969) found no significant differences in the average guilty ver-
dicts as an effect of differing affluence of the defendant as inferred 
from residence cues. 
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These studies suggest that the higher SES defendant will receive 
greater leniency from a jury than will the l0wer SES defendant, although 
this, by itself, may be insufficient to affect verdicts and sentencing. 
The effects of the variable of the race of the defendant may affect the 
length of imposed sentence. Race of the defendant, acting in conjunction 
with the type of crime, has been found to produce differential sentencing 
in actual jury proceedings in the state of Texas (Bullock, 1961). 
These extraneous factors of the defendant have been shown to affect 
experimental and, at times, actual trial outcomes. But defendants are 
not the only source of extraneous influences in a trial. The individual 
jurors bring their own set of potentially prejudicial influences. 
C. Demographic Variables: Jurors 
Jurors differ in their predisposition to accept a verdict of defend-
ant guilt. Two studies have examined the correlation of juror demo-
graphic variables with individual juror verdicts. Reed (1965) surveyed 
jurors from a variety of criminal proceedings and discovered that a ver-
dict of guilty was more likely to be rendered by a person of higher 
educational level, higher social status, and who had a record of previous 
jury service. Factors which were not significantly correlated with 
guilty verdicts included age, marital status, religious preference, or 
amount of church attendance. Sealy and Cornish (1973) charted the effect 
of selected demographic variables for individual juror verdicts in cases 
of theft and rape. The only consistent differential result among the 
variables of age, sex, education, occupational status, and legal experi-
ence was that of age. Jurors under the age of 30 years were more lenient 
in their guilt judgments than were older jurors. The more liberal sexual 
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attitudes among the young in conjunction with a leniency tendency may 
well produce a different judicial outcome in a rape trial than would an 
older, more attitudinally conservative jury. 
1. Attitude Similarity 
Another variable affecting probability of conviction and harshness 
of imposed sentence is attitude similarity. A variety of cues may pro-
vide the initial perceived similarity. In general, when the details of 
the crime are held constant, a defendant similar to the jurors on atti-
tudinal measures will probably be sentenced to a shorter prison term. 
Attitude similarity does not always mitigate against long sentences, how-
ever (Bray, 1974). The perceived attitudinal similarity affects factors 
other than sentencing. The more the perceived similarity between the 
jurors and the defendant, the less they judge him/her to be guilty and 
blameworthy (Gleason & Harris, 1976; Lund, Lewis & Harris, 1974). Atti-
tude similarity between the defendant and the jurors often results in a 
judgment of less guilt of culpability (Bray, 1974). 
The amount of perceived attitudinal similarity also affects factors 
such as interpersonal attraction. Interpersonal attraction for a 
stranger varies as a function of the amount of perceived attitude simi-
larity (Byrne, 1965). Byrne (1971) has indicated that liking tends to 
increase linearly as the proportion of commonly-held similar attitudes 
increases. Griffitt and Jackson (1973) manipulated similarit1 of atti-
tudes unrelated to the judicial process between the defendant and the 
defendant and the jurors, and found a significant effect. Attitudinally 
similar jurors rated the defendant as more attractive and less guilty, 
imposing shorter and more lenient sentences in guilty cases. In a 
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subsequent investigation, Mitchell and Byrne (1973) showed that subjects 
scoring high on the ~-Scale, indicating high authoritarianism, were re-
sponding to the similarity information in making their judicial decision, 
whereas low authoritarianism subjects showed no significant differences 
as a result of the similarity information. 
2. Authoritarianism 
The personality variable of authoritarianism has received experi-
mental attention within the individual juror paradigm. Individuals who 
score high on the ~-Scale tend to exhibit rigidity, intolerance, and a 
proclivity to punish others who violate social norms (Adorno et al., 
1950). In the justice system, the general finding is that the authori-
tarian juror may be biased toward guilty verdicts. Boehm (1968) found 
that high authoritarians brought in more guilty verdicts than did per-
sons scoring as low authoritarians. High authoritarians and more con-
servative jurors tend to give significantly longer sentences and longer 
terms before eligibility for parole than do liberal and low authoritari-
an jurors (Bray, 1974). The high authoritarian subjects allowed trial 
irrelevant information to affect their judgments, whereas low authori-
tarian subjects disregarded that information concerning the defendant's 
character as directed by the judge (Mitchell & Byrne, 1973). In a mock 
theft case, authoritarian-but not egalitarian jurors were swayed in 
determining guilt by the similarity or dissimilarity of the defendant's 
attitudes (Mitchell & Bryne, 1973). The trend seems to be that jurors 
high in authoritarianism tend to recommend longer sentences and exhibit 
greater punitiveness. These are individual juror results, and care must 
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be taken in generalizing from these results due to the demonstrable leni-
ency shift in juror outcomes following deliberations. 
In summary, many demographic and extraneous influences operate on 
trial juries. Some of these influences include sex of the juror, sex of 
the witness, introduction of inadmissible evidence, amount and type of 
pretrial publicity, interpersonal attraction, defendant remorse, defendant 
socio-economic status, and race. These factors have been shown to influ-
ence experimental and actual trial outcomes. 
Jurors who have higher educational levels, higher social status, a 
record of previous jury service, and ages over 30 years have been experi-
mentally found to exhibit a preference for guilty verdicts. The vari-
ables of attitude similarity between defendant and jurors, interpersonal 
attraction, and juror authoritarianism may all differentially modify 
eventual verdicts. 
CHAP'l'ER VIII 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Historically, investigations in this area have manipulated facts or 
dimensions of evidence and relied on averages of individual juror judg-
ments to project trial outcomes. The literature surveyed clearly indi-
cates that rape trial dispositions are very sensitive to variations in 
amount and kind of factual information presented. In addition to control-
ling for the evidence presented, other factors should be taken into 
account which also influence rape trial dispositions. For example, the 
attitudes of all participants in the trial setting may bias the proceed-
ings regardless of the factual or legal situation. A host of other 
factors, such as age, prior victimization, inadmissible evidence, socio-
economic status, social stability, interpersonal attractiveness, race, and 
sex can influence the outcome of trial deliberations. 
Often, studies have not examined the effect of jury deliberation. 
The deliberation process in actual criminal trials is entrusted to secrecy 
since they cannot be taped or observed. Thus, it is exceedingly difficult 
to obtain empirically sound studies of deliberation effects which are 
similar to real-world proceedings. Factors to be controlled for, or ex-
perimentally manipulated, are as follows: (1) simulation jurors should 
be similar to actual jurors in perceptual and attitudinal set, and (2) 
the amount of information and method of presentation of trial material 
should be consistent for all jurors. Some authors suggest that individual 
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and group measures should be taken in experimental situations (Miller, 
Fontes, Boster, & Sunnafrank, 1977). 'However, there is a concern that if 
measures are used with individual jurors who then become part of an oper-
ational jury, the juror may be inadvertantly sensitized to certain aspects 
of the courtroom proceeding and thereby biased. This effect is predicted 
to be operating in rape trials. In one sense, these trials come to resem-
ble the versatile chameleon. As sur~ly as the color of the surroundings 
determines the color of the chameleon's skin, the situation surrounding a 
rape trial changes verdicts and penalties change. 
The objective of the proposed research is to investigate the impact 
of gender difference effects among jurors and on the outcome of a rape 
trial. In order to investigate the effects of such factors on the dis-
position of a rape trial, an experimental design must be utilized that 
takes into account the following constraints: first, the initial trial 
materials and transcripts must be essentially unbiased toward either the 
prosecution or the defense so .that trial outcome is not predetermined by 
the nature of the evidence; and second, the trial jury must be allowed to 
engage in deliberation in order to approximate as closely as is practical 
the actual proceeding of a trial. 
One of the major methodological improvements in the proposed study is 
the freedom from the specific effects of the evidentiary dimensions: the 
rape trial proceeding to be used for this study has equal points of evi-
dence on each side. Testimony of the victim is, however, somewhat more 
substantial; this element was allowed due to the tendency of most simula-
tion juries to acquit most defendants. There is no corroboration of any 
of the victim's testimony with the exception of prompt complaint to the 
authorities and the police officer's testimony attesting to evidence of 
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physical harm to the victim. The medical doctor's testimony does not 
verify whether or not intercourse was achiev0d nor does it attest to the 
use of force. Neither the victim nor the defendant can substantiate their 
own versions of what did or did not happen. It simply becomes a matter of 
which of two mutually exclusive stories will be believed by the jury. 
Another way in which this investigation is unique is in the nature of 
the stimulus materials utilized. Other investigations have for the most 
part used modified transcripts of actual rape trial proceedings or impro-
vised scenarios which vary evidentiary dimensions. The simulation juror 
thus has a vastly constricted array of stimuli~on which to base his/her 
judicial judgment, and may show spurious significance in relation to the 
varied dimensions. During the actual trial, the jurors are exposed not 
only to the verbal content but also to a host of other cues such as voice 
and tonal inflections, verbal context, and answer structure. Nonverbal 
communication which accompanies the verbal information includes the ef-
fects of proxemics, chronemics, kinesics, and paralinguistics (Gordon, 
1975). Proxemic communication involves the conveyance of meaning through 
the use of interpersonal space. Chronemics involves the use of time. 
Kinesic communication is the use of body movement in order to aid in the 
communicating of meaning. Paralinguistic communication includes volume, 
pitch, and voice quality. All of these cues modify, support, or disqual-
ify the verbal communication of meaning. Due to their power in influenc-
ing juror perception of the validity and salience of presented evidence, 
these factors must be included in any realistic study of judicial process. 
In this study a videotape of a mock trial with actors will be used in 
which all of these cues are evident. 
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Rape as an issue has been shown in the literature to be sensitive to 
the effect of gender. In this author's opinion, in rape trials the most 
important factors that influence jury proceedings and outcomes are sex 
difference effects among jurors and juror attitudes. In order to inves-
tigate the potential factor of sex differences among jurors upon the 
deliberation process, five experimental juries will be formed and tested. 
The five juries will have the following composition: one jury will be 
composed of only male subjects; one will have nine male and three female 
members; one will be equally balanced by sex with six male and six female 
members; one will have nine female and three male members, and one will 
be composed entirely of female subject-jurors. It is expected that dif-
ferent evidentiary issues will recieve different emphases in the different 
juries. Pretesting has yielded the following categories of issues: harm 
to the victim; possibility of escape; whether the defendant was physically 
capable of intercourse; the desire for more evidence; testimony of the 
medical doctor; the intoxication of the defendant; whether the victim was 
also intoxicated; testimony concerning a lack of semen in the vaginal 
specimen; legal requirements to establish rape; how the defendant and the 
complainant parted company; whether the complainant was abducted; alter-
nate interpretations of facts and motivations; the direction of travel; 
invocation of the reasonable doubt standard; whether the rape charge was 
mistaken; nonverbal cues of the actors; amount of resistance by the com-
plainant; the marital status of the defendant; amount of threat; and a 
miscellaneous category for pauses, digressions, and balloting. As the 
nature of the present investigation is exploratory, no specific hypotheses 




A videotape based on a modified rape trial transcript has been made 
using graduate student actors. The trial segments include the testi-
monies of the defendant, the victim, the medical doctor, and the police 
officer. The doctor had failed to collect any corroborative evidence 
which would have aided in establishing the validity of the victim's com-
plaint. Thus, no conclusive medical evidence is offered regarding pene-
tration or the use of force. Without legal corroboration, it becomes a 
matter of the relative believability of the victim or the defendant. 
The trial sequence ends with the judge's instructions of the jury regard-
ing law and the rules of evidence, and the matter is turned over to the 
deliberation of the jury. No specific outcome is suggested. 
B. Subjects 
Five twelve-member juries were formed. The subjects were recruited 
from university classes for the summer term. All subjects were eligible 
for jury service. The demographic characteristics of these juries are 
presented in Table I below. 
C. Procedure 




DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERIMENTAL JURIES 
Characteristics Jury 1 Jury 2 Jury 3 Jury 4 Jury 5 
Sex 
Male 0 3 6 9 12 
Female 12 9 6 3 0 
Age 
18 to 19 7 7 0 5 4 
20 to 24 5 5 10 4 8 
25 to 29 0 0 2 3 0 
Race 
Caucasian 12 12 9 11 11 
Afro-American 0 0 2 1 1 
Native American 0 0 1 0 0 
Marital Status 
Single 12 12 12 10 11 
Married 0 0 0 2 1 
Prior Jury Service 
Yes 0 0 1 1 0 
No 12 12 11 11 12 
Self or Family Member 
Convicted of Crime? 
Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
No 12 12 12 12 12 
Related to Law Enforce-
ment Officer? 
Yes 0 3 5 8 6 
No 12 9 7 4 6 
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general psychology classes in order to determine if it was biased toward 
either the prosecution or the defense. The 36 male and 58 female sub-
jects completed the general demographic questionnaire (Appendix E) and 
rendered their individual verdicts without engaging in deliberation. 
The average of the guilty verdicts submitted by these subjects was 53.19 
percent. This indicated that the trial materials were essentially un-
biased toward either the defense or prosecution. A gender effect in the 
verdicts was observed: 69.44 percent of the male subjects returned not 
guilty verdicts compared to 32.76 percent of the female subjects whore-
turned not guilty verdicts. 
Each of the five juries and one control group were separately 
sequestered in the Observation Jury Room, an experimental· room in a 
university building. The experimental juries reported to the Jury Room 
where they were greeted and seated. Before beginning any experimental 
participation, each juror signed a legal waiver form as provided by the 
Oklahoma State University legal counsel (Appendix B). The waiver form 
stipulates that all subjects are willingly submitting to an experimental 
process which has not been completely revealed for their understanding 
in order to prevent invasion of privacy. The bailiff instructed the 
jury in the following manner: 
As you may be aware, one of the serious problems facing 
the criminal justice system is that defendants must often 
wait weeks or months in order for their cases to come to 
trial. We have begun an experimental test of other methods 
of trial proceedings to see whether these other methods can 
both save time and give defendants a fair trial. You have 
been selected as a representative jury here in Payne County. 
We would like for you to serve as a jury for the trial that 
you are about to see. 
We have filmed a trial that has already been disposed. 
However, we do not know whether a jury would reach the same 
decision for a filmed trial as it would for a trial conducted 
in the usual manner. If juries could decide filmed trials in 
the same fair manner that they decide regular trials, the 
justice system could save much time and provide defendants 
with a more speedy trial. In order to test this procedure,we 
would like for you to view the trial film as seriously as 
though your final decision were binding on the defendant. 
Are you ready to begin? 
Subjects were given a brief voir dire examination. No voir dire chal-
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lenges were exercised. After being sworn in by the bailiff, the juries 
reviewed the videotaped rape trial. The general outline of the trial 






Information is read to the court. 
Testimony of the victim, establishing her charge. 
Medical testimony, attesting to the attempted inter-
course sometime in the past 12 to 24 hours; no evi-
dence of the use of force other than bruising; no 
evidence of ejaculation. 
1' Police officer's testimony of bruising of the vic-
tim's neck. 
16' Testimony of the defendant, claiming impotence due 
to intoxication. 
7' Judge instructs the jury and dismisses them to begin 
deliberation under a unanimity rule. 
The judge instructed the jurors to select a foreman and begin deli-
beration. The auditory portion of all deliberations were covertly re-
corded. Upon completion of the deliberation, the jury reported its 
verdict to the bailiff. Jurors were then administered the Attitudes 
Toward Women Scale (Spence, Helmrich & Stopp, 1973; Appendix C), and 
Trohdahl and Powell's (1965) Short-Form Dogmatism Scale (Appendix D). 
After completing.the questionnaires, the jurors were debriefed .. They 
were asked not to discuss the case or their verdict with anyone else in 
order not to contaminate the subject pool. The bailiff answered all 
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questions except how the actual trial was resolved. Subjects were then 
thanked for their service and dismissed. 
A control group of eight males and eight females viewed the trial 
videotape in a manner similar to the experimental juries but were not 
allowed to engage in deliberation. After rendering their individual 
verdicts, these subjects were administered a 25---item examination cover-
ing the content of the trial videotape in order to determine the level 
of information that can be accurately retrieved immediately following 
the viewing of the trial (Appendix A) • 
CHAPTER X 
RESULTS 
All juries returned verdicts of not guilty. The pattern of ballot-
ing and amount of deliberation time for each jury may be seen in Table 
II. All juries reached their final verdict by the third ballot. Signi-
ficant differences were obtained for the amount of deliberation time 
utilized by the predominantly male juries (Juries 4 and 5) and the pre-
dominantly female juries (Juries 1 and 2), with x2 (76) = 2549.72 and 
.12. < • 001. Only Jury 1 took a ballot immediately upon entering delibera·-
tion. The other juries took their first ballots some time after an ini-
tial period of discussion. A content analysis and elapsed time measures 
were conducted for the deliberations of each jury. An independent rater 
scored one trial tape for reliability purposes and a correlation coeffi-
cient of .96 was obtained for accuracy of both time measures and content 
assignment. The data were analyzed for group effects and individual 
effects. 
A. Group Effects 
The group data compare, by means of a x2 analysis, the effect of 
the various gender combinations of juries on the amount of elapsed time 
each issue occupied. The amount of time each jury spent discussing 
these issues was recorded. Since juries discuss different topics and 
sometimes discuss several topics simultaneously, the nature of the data 
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Composition 
Jury Male Female 
1 0 12 
2 3 9 
3 6 6 
"4 9 3 
5 12 0 
TABLE II 
PATTERN OF BALLOTING AND DELIBERATION TIME 
Ballot 1 Ballot 2 Ballot 3 
Not Don't Not Don't Not 
Guilty Guilty Know Guilty Guilty Know Guilty Guilty 
5 6 1 3 9 0 0 12 
2 9 1 0 12 0 
2 8 2 4 7 1 0 12 
1 10 1 0 12 0 
















g~gt~te two measures of elapsed time scoring. First, the amount of time 
§~gh j~!Y ~pent in discussion of single issues was determined. Second, 
~~@~§ ©t gi§g~s§ion which integrate or cross several issues necessitate 
§@@~in~ of g~ntent in sex-second units. The pretest material suggested 
thet Q~!~hg~~ ~p~grs on the average spend six seconds in verbalization 
@f §fi§ §f?ntgng~. The time measures are presumed to be additive. The 
va~i§g !~~mgths of deliberation were normalized in order to establish the 
~§!at!V© p~!9©Dt~ges of standard time the different issues occupied the 
~Y~!@§~ 'fh©. :five jp~ies which varied in gender composition spent signi-
fi§an.t!y V~!.if?d pg!.g§ntages of time on the different issues involved in 
thf? fE!P@ t~ia!, ~~th ~2 (76) = 3584.17, E < .001. Across all juries the 
i§§Y§§ W@ff? ~an~ gr4~!.§d in descending amounts of occupied time. Both 
@V§fa!! pg~ggntag~s ~f time utilized by the jurors for each issue and 
!n9~vi9Ya! ~~!Y !~sults may be seen in Table III. Male and female jurors 
W€~@ ~~§t ggpce~ned with whether the defendant could have raped the vie-
t!~ ~$ Gharged. Overall, harm to the victim was the most discussed issue 
~n.g gggypi~d !0.41 percent of the time. Determining whether the com-
~!~in~nt w~s gbducted received 9.76 percent of the time, establishing 
Whr?thgr th~ ggfendant was physically capable of intercourse received 8.49 
~@~§§fit gf th© time, and the possibilities for escape by the victim re-
§§!V§§ ~~~@ P@f?©n.t of the time. 
In ~rg§gm!nant!y f~male juries, the issues of harm to the victim and 
th€ g§:fgn§ant'e @epa?ity to commit the crime were emphasized. In predom-
inantly rna!€ ~Yfi@§, the ~ssues of harm to the victim and the circum-
§tafi@§§ §Yff©Yn.4!n.g initial contact between assilant and victim received 
tfig ffi9§t §mPhasis during deliberation. Other issues which emerged on a 
~f@Va!§nt Pee!§ ing:J,~ggd the testimony of the doctor, particularly 
TABLE III 
ELAPSED DELIBERATION TIME PER ISSUE 
Jury 1 Jury 2 Jury 3 Jury 4 Jury 5 2 
Abso- Abso- Abso- Abso- Abso- Total X Comparing 
Per- lute Per- lute Per- lute Per- lute Per- lute Overall Time Juries 1 & 2 
Issue cent Sec •. cent Sec. cent Sec. cent Sec. cent Sec. Percent in Sec. With 4 & 5* 
Harm 12.83 192 2.43 25 14.73 354 5.14 68 16.92 45 10.41 684 168.30 
Abduction 3.47 52 7.19 74 8.32 200 19.67 260 10.15 27 9.76 613 24.59 
Defendant's 
Capacity 6.41 96 19.24 198 .71 17 4.46 59 11.65 31 8.49 401 287.00 
Escape 6.81 102 5.34 55 8.24 198 5.75 76 3.76 10 5.98 441 342.68 
Doctor's 
Testimony 3.81 57 4.66 48 4.16 100 7.26 96 6.39 17 5.26 318 12.30 
Alternate 
Explanations 6.15 92 19.30 464 2.27 30 5.54 586 172.18 
Legal Require-
ments 1.87 28 8.36 86 2.00 48 11.28 30 2.70 192 182.57 
Want Evidence 12.63 189 1.07 11 .83 20 7.03 93 4.31 313 90.09 
Defendant 
Intoxicated 6.68 100 2.62 27 8.24 198 .45 6 3.60 331 203.72 
Resistance 8.75 90 3.33 80 2.12 28 2.84 198 59.78 
Parting Company 1.00 15 2.82 29 4.99 66 1. 76 110 68.88 
Travel 3.27 49 .87 21 3.03 40 1.43 llO 614.90 
Defendant's r> 
Marital Status • 58 6 3.00 72 2.57 34 1.23 ll2 74.90 0 
0 
TABLE III (CONTINUED) 
Jury 1 Jury 2 Jury 3 Jury 4 Jury 5 
Abso- Abso- Abso- Ahso- Ahso-
Per- lute Per- lute Per- lute Per- lute Per- lute 
Issue cent Sec. cent Sec. cent Sec. cent Sec. cent Sec. 
Threat 3.70 89 1.97 26 
Nonverbal Cues .78 8 2.12 28 
Victim Intoxi-
cated 3.41 82 
Lack of Ejacu-
lation 2.07 31 --- .25 6 
Mistaken Charge 1. 75 18 
Reasonable 
Doubt 1.34 20 
Miscellaneous 31.66 474 34.40 354 18.93 455 31.16 412 39.84 106 
Totals 100 1497 99.99 1029 100.02 2404 99.99 1322 99.99 266 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
*All 
2 
analyses significant with E. < .005 at 76 degrees of freedom. X were 
Total 
Overall Time 
Percent in Sec. 
1.13 115 










Juries 1 & 2 












concerning whether it was possible for a rape to occur without evidence 
of ejaculation. All of the juries expressed the desire for more evi-
dence. They discussed the state of intoxication of the defendant and 
questioned the sobriety of the victim. They were interested in how the 
complainant came to be in the company of the defendant and how they 
parted company. The requirements of the law were taken into account in 
weighing evidence and establishing a standard of reasonable doubt. 
Several jurors spent time trying out alternate explanations for the 
facts and motivations involved in the case. 
B. Individual Effects 
In addition to the group data, individual jurors provided attitud-
inal information to aid in clarification of the social processes operat-
ing during a rape trial. The attitudinal data included the jurors' 
scores on the Attitudes Toward Women Scale and Trohdahl and Powell's 
Short-Form Dogmatism Scale. Scores on both these measures were corre-
lated with initial juror verdict utilizing a point biserial correlation 
analysis. 
A nonsignificant correlation of .017 was observed between the Atti-
tudes Toward Women Scale scores and the initial juror verdict. A non-
significant correlation of -.207 was observed for the initial verdict 
and a measure of juror dogmatism. Scores on the two measures may be 
found in Table IV. 
Some jurors are expected to change their ballots during the delib-
eration process. The relationship of ballot changing behavior to gender 
of the juror was assessed. Female jurors changed their initial guilt 









SU~~RY STATISTICS OF JURORS' ATTITUDES 
TOWARD WOMEN AND DOGMATISM SCORES 
Attitudes Toward Women 
Standard 
Composition Mean Deviation 
females 78.83 10.90 
females/3 males 75.08 7.43 
females/6 males 71.00 8.63 
males/3 females 74.45 7.70 
males 65.00 9.07 















male jurors, x2 (l) = 18.28, E < .005. Over all juries, changes from 
initial balloting were observed for 13.3 percent of male jurors and 
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36.7 percenL of female jurors, for an average of 25 percent of the total 
juror ballots. 
The control group of eight male and eight female subjects scored 
82.2 percent on the information recall test. Within that group, male 
subjects accurately recalled 83.13 percent and female subjects recalled 




The experimental juries showed significant differences in the over-
all amount of deliberation time expended for each issue. The juries 
discussed a variety of issues, yet each jury eventually voted to acquit 
the defendant of rape charges. The scores on the Attitudes Toward Women 
Scale and the Dogmatism Scale do not indicate a systematic predisposition 
for guilty verdicts. The issues which received more emphasis during 
deliberations were harm to the victim, how the victim and defendant be-
came involved, whether the defendant had the physical capacity to comn1it 
rape, and possibilities for the victim to escape the defendant. Both 
male and female jurors were most concerned with harm to the victim. The 
predominantly female juries were also concerned with the defendant's 
capacity to commit the crime as charged and predominantly male juries were 
interested in how the defendant and victim came to share one another's 
company. The jurors may have different emphas~s and areas of concern, but 
they served with equal conscientiousness for the most part. 
Of the trial jurors, significantly more females than males changed 
their verdicts. Although the pretest evidence suggests that females more 
often than males will individually find the defendant guilty, social in-
fluence processes operating during deliberation works toward acquittal. 
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The literature reports leniency shifts as a frequently observed phenomenon 
accompanying deliberation. The verdict change for each juror is specific 
and is an inseparable part of an adversary jury deliberation. One element 
may well be the array of attitudinal factors which are advanced by indi-
vidual jurors. The attitudes affect the verdicts in an indirect fashion 
by influencing communication patterns, filtering the recalled information 
available to each juror, and determining the relative weights each juror 
assigns to the testimony of the defendant and prosecutrix. 
The implications of these findings for the criminal justice system 
include that focus on specific iss.ues alone will not dictate a jury ver-
dict. The issue of harm to the victim has the most salience for male and 
female jurors alike. 
B. Attitudinal Milieu 
The jurors during deliberations revealed a number of attitudes which 
they held prior to serving as jurors for a rape case. In many cases the 
attitudes were manifested with some degree of emotional intensity and 
often they were based on irrational or nonapplicable beliefs regarding the 
dynamics of rape, and in a larger sense, about the nature of male/female 
relationships. The suspiciousness toward the female victim which is prev-
alent in rape trial jurors (Krulewitz, 1977; Taylor, 1977) was observed in 
these experimental subjects as well. In all of the juries examined, the 
~urors showed a consistent emphasis on the testimony of the complainant. 
She is the accuser and it is to the accuser that the burden of proof prop-
erly falls. The juries spent 32 percent of their collective discussion 
time on the topic of her testimony and personal characteristics and 13.5 
percent discussing the testimony and characteristics of the accused. Such 
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an imbalance in the time proportions suggests that the testimony of the 
accuser was tried in every detail by the jurors, while the testimony of 
the accused was presumed to be essentially accurate. The jurors did not 
necessarily believe in the truth of the testimony of the defendant. As 
one juror stated: "They are both lying. Let's send them up for perjury." 
In spite of such comments casting doubt on the veracity of the defendant, 
all experimental juries acquitted the defendant of rape charges. 
Overwhelming emphasis on the complainant's testimony was not the 
only sign of the suspiciousness with which the jurors viewed the complain-
ant. A theme repeated across juries was the desire for more witnesses. 
The jurors were faced with an ambiguous situation in which they were 
forced toward a resolution. During the deliberation process each juror 
must have felt the pressures of social influence aimed toward social con-
sensus, coupled with the constraints posed by the facts in the case, and 
the effect of attitudes held by individual jurors which were formed prior 
to their experimental service. The jurors would have liked to have the 
case virtually resolve itself on evidentiary bounds, yet real world juries 
face a similar ambiguous situation. The construction of the case revolved 
around the testimony of the prosecutrix, the defendant, the medical doc-
tor's and the police officer's testimony. Numerous complaints were made 
about the shoddy examination performed by the medical doctor without 
realization that in real world situations the examination often is pre-
cisely as superficial. The jurors wanted.extra witnesses to every detail 
of the victim's version, even expressing the desire for witnesses to the 
actual rape sequence. "If there were just more witnesses to the fact 
that she'd been raped" (male juror). In only one instance did a juror 
attempt to support the victim: "You'd never know 100 percent unless you 
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were there." In view of the finding by Kalven and Zeisal (1966) that 
there are eyewitnesses to the rape in only 4 percent of the tried cases, 
many rape juries will dismiss the charges of rape victims that are un-
substantiated by eyewitness testimony. Such a tendency imposes an 
excessive legal burden on the victim of a perpetrated crime. 
l. Sexism and Mythology 
The sexism exhibited toward the female complainant during jury delib-
erations was an influence toward acquittal of the male defendant on a rape 
charge. The suggestion has been made that one problem that women have in 
attaining convictions for their rapists is that the accuser is always fe-
male and the defendant is always male. One juror stated: "It's just his 
word against hers--there's the doubt right there." The jurors also at-
tributed differing perceptions of the victim's nonverbal cues during the 
videotaped trial to differing motivations: during deliberations in Juries 
1 and 3 jurors who felt that the victim was upset interpreted it as evi-
dence she was lying, while jurors who felt she was not upset cited it as 
evidence she had not been raped. 
The sexism was evidenced in the citation by jurors of various myths 
about rape and the dynamics of male/female interactions. In juries com-
posed of mixed groups of males and females, the jurors checked the accu-
racy of certain elements of testimony across gender lines. Mixed juries 
discussed various issues such as the feasibility of attempted escape of 
the victim, whether the victim should fight back against her assailant, 
whether a male can be too drunk to have intercourse, and whether males 
experience impairment of ejaculation under some conditions. In same sex 
juries, or predominantly same sex juries, they tend to assume things about 
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the functioning of the other sex. In general, the females were more re-
sponsive and knowledgeable about male functi0ning and psychology than 
males were about females. However, probably as a supposition, they tended 
to attribute super human capacities to the male. For example, one female 
juror expressed the following belief: "I don't think that a guy can be 
too drunk not to have intercourse." Similarly, individual jurors in four 
juries assumed that if he raped her there would be ejaculation of semen, 
in contradiction to findings previously cited in the literature of a lack 
of ejaculation as a common finding in single and multiple assailant rapes 
(Groth & Burgess, 1977). Both male and female jurors expressed disbelief 
that a female victim could be ignorant of the details of male physiology 
and capacities to the extent that she could be uncertain whether or not 
her assailant had an erection. The jurors had no tolerance of her inno-
cence in sexual matters and assumed her discomfort was due to her attempt 
to lie about the matter. They felt that "If she hadn't experienced inter-
course before there would have been more evidence, and if she had she 
would have known if he was erected." One consultation between the sexes 
took the following form: Female: "If you were really drunk and you think 
that it's going to be necessary to rape a girl because you need sex so 
bad, could you get it up and go through the whole thing?" Male: "If you 
need sex that bad it would seem it had already come up" (laughter). No 
juror ever challenged the necessity for rape in order to discharge sexual 
needs. 
One myth which surfaced during the deliberations of Juries 2 and 3 
contained the belief that married men do not rape. Some jurors made 
errors in recall of presented information on the matter of marital status 
of the defendant. The flavor of the attitude can be seen in the following 
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comments drawn from the deliberations of those juries. "Why was he out 
of town if he was married? He got married afterwards [error, uncorrected 
by other jurors]." "Why would a married man rape? He wasn't married then 
[error]." "Some married guy isn't going to take some chick to the field 
anyway." In a twist of expectations, some jurors held the wife responsi-
ble for her husband's criminal act. "Why if he went home wasn't his wife 
there?" Female jurors as well as male jurors held the wife responsible, 
as the discussion between these three females illustrates. Female 1: 
"If he needed some, he could go home to his wife." Female 2: "They 
shouldn't have brought that up in testimony." Female 3: "That's not true 
though. Maybe his wife isn't putting out and maybe she's too far away and 
maybe she's got the crud." 
One male juror excused the defendant in the following manner: "You'd 
think that his wife would have known about him before they got married, 
surely." The suggestion is the mirror image of the earlier myth that 
married men do not rape, namely that rapists do not marry. The effect of 
the myth that married men do not rape is to produce a leniency shift for 
married male defendants for rape charges. As one male juror expressed in 
the safety of the all-male jury: "Anybody want to convict that old boy 
just for what he's done? He's paid. He's gotten married." 
2. Resistance 
Female jurors in general were more understanding to the victim than 
male jurors on the issue of proper resistance. The female jurors recog-
nized that "With his hands he could kill her, that's all you need." The 
bruises on her neck, indicative of strangulation, were counted by some 
jurors as evidence of force, inflicted harm and proof that the. defendant 
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possessed "apparent power of execution" of his threat to kill her as 
specified by Oklahoma law. Other jurors viewed them as superficial marks 
sustained in a moment of passion. Male jurors tended to assume that if 
the victim did not manifest unceasing general physical resistance, then 
she had not in fact been raped. The relative attitudes of the jurors may 
be seen in the following excerpt from the nine female-three male jury: 
Male: "If some guy on the Strip 150 pounds bigger than me hit me, I'd hit 
him back." Female: "But you're a guy, too." Male: "He could beat hell 
out of me. " Female: "I'd hit the guy back." Female: "I've never 
hit anybody." Female: "I'd begin right then. " Male: "I'd start it. 
You know that he's going to kill you anyway but you might as well leave 
him with some thought." Female: "No way. I'd be petrified." 
The female complainant in the rape trial segment had rather passively 
accepted her violation, as many women do who are overpowered physically 
and/or psychologically. Jurors who hold traditional attitudes will inter-
pret her passivity not as the product of her American socialization but 
rather as evidence of her collusion in her rape. Since they also discount 
actual inflicted harm, the rape victim must draw an exceedingly fine bal-
ance between providing enough resistance to avoid collusion charges and 
not enough resistance to provoke her rapist to kill her. 
3. Consent and Collusion 
Individual jurors serving in various juries dealt with the ambiguity 
inherent in the situation by trying out alternative stories which varied 
in the amount of consent and collusion attributed to the victim. These 
stories ranged from probable explanations which were based on the present-
ed testimony to highly improbable fanciful tales; similarly, other jury 
members sometimes endorsed and sometimes ridiculed these alternative 
interpretations. Occasionally, the stories contained the presumption 
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that the rape had been actually a completed act, yet the intent of the 
teller was to excuse or defend the accused. The first example captures 
the idea that the female loses her right to refuse intercourse after some 
unspecified time or action. Female: "She willfully went along but she 
changed her mind before it even happened--and he was too far gone and she 
said no and he said you can't go this far and turn me down." Female: "He 
might have thought she was teasing." Male: "If they didn't do anything, 
what is the purpose of getting him committed for rape?" Female: "He did 
do something but she went along--she could have been a tease for all that 
you know--and decided 'Heck, I'm sobered up--forget it' and he said 'Well, 
tough luck, sweetheart.'" 
Not all jurors endorse the presumption that the victim consents to 
intercourse if she consents to share the company of a male, as the follow-
ing two illustrations suggest. Female: "One of them is lying. Maybe 
she's lyirig on part of it and she's just embarrassed to say 'I did leave 
with him--he did rape me--and now I'm upset.' That could happen too. We 
can't rely on witnesses to a forced abduction; they could have left and 
she changed her mind." Female: "She left willingly; he was too fast for 
her; she could have been real drunk and started sobering up toward the end 
--he was still drinking--he raped her and she got hysterical." Some 
jurors assume that intercourse with consent may provoke guilt in the fe-
male. The implication is that female guilt may be manifested in unbased 
claims of forcible rape. Female: "Maybe she felt really stupid, drank 
too much beer, went off with some guy, especially one that's married, and 
here she is. Now this is three years ago; maybe things aren't quite so 
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liberal as now." Unfounded rape charges can also be produced by the out-
rage of "a woman scorned," according to some jurors. Female: "Maybe it 
happened that he left her and said he didn't want to have anything to do 
with her and she got upset because she really liked him." Some jurors ex-
cused the defendant of all collusion in the matter, ignoring the testimony 
of the doctor regarding penetration and infliction of physical harm. 
Female: "I think she went to drink beer with him and she got drunk and 
wild and he didn't want to take advantage of her because he knew that she 
was drunk and not a lady or something." The factors of inflicted harm and 
penetrating intercourse were separated and rearranged sequentially by some 
of the jurors. Female: "She went out with him and he set her up and you 
know and she big-mouthed him and he beat her up." Male: "As they were 
leaving she could have gotten this idea in her head and started being a 
bitch and he might have hauled off and walloped her." Female: "She has 
more than one bruise." 
4. Harm to the Victim 
Alternative explanations for the harm to the victim were more diffi-
cult to construct than were alternative:stories:about:the charged-rape. 
Some explanations which were advanced included the possibility that the 
victim had had a fight with her boyfriend the night before, that she had 
been drunk and fallen down, and that she could have gotten the bruises 
during the week preceeding the incident. One juror explained the doctor's 
testimony indicating vaginal swelling consistent with intercourse in terms 
of the possibility that she could have had intercourse with someone else, 
which would have been legitimate if mistaken identity had been an offered 
defense. Another juror explained the swelling as a possible side effect 
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of riding a bicycle. One juror made the following statement: "We must 
consider that he may have been plastered and couldn't get it up. That 
could account for her vaginal bruising." Here the juror has admitted the 
fact of penetration but the intent was to refute the charge of rape. Both 
introduced testimony and the visual images of the victim and defendant 
suggested that she was of slight frame weighing 103 pounds and that he was 
a muscular man of approximately six feet in height. Regardless of these 
considerations, male and female jurors felt that she could have physically 
restrained the assault against her person. Female: "She could have 
fought him off. I'd have tore [sic] his eyeballs out of it was [sic] me." 
"She never saw a gun or weapon to hurt her." "If he was that drunk [i.e. 
too drunk to have an erection] she wouldn't have to use that much force to 
push him off if he was just going to beat her up." 
5. Response to Victimization 
In the process of deliberations, several jurors revealed their atti-
tudes concerning what was a "proper" response to victimization. Some 
jurors felt that the victim must exhibit unceasing resistance for the rape 
charge to be justified. Actual physical resistance was the accepted stan-
dard of proper behavior. Females also advanced other methods of response. 
The dialogue following contains the response of passive acceptance. 
Female: "Both have discrepancies in their stories. I feel she did some-
thing she felt guilty about doing that was not right. She is trying to 
cover it up. Lots of girls do that." Female: They do go through all 
that?" Female: "You know how people try to convince themselves." 
Female: "She wasn't very convincing to me and I think if I'd been raped, 
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I could convince someone very well." Female: "Could you, if you were 
so shook up? I'd try to block the whole thL1g from my mind. " 
The victim has little resolution other than internalization of the 
rape experience and silent tolerance of the victimization, according to 
experimental jurors. These themes are extended in the idea captured by 
the following: "That girl would have wanted to be dead if it actually 
happened." One female juror who consistently excused the defendant and 
took an actively pro-defendant offensive stance responded to a comment 
from another female juror in the following manner: "If I was her and 
been scared and hit, I wouldn't have run in the country where it would do 
no good. " Female: II .. nothing else to happen but to die--he'd already 
done it all." She thus believed that the defendant accomplished the rape 
and simultaneously refused to declare him guilty in the matter. 
The repeated theme advocating the passive acceptance and internal-
ization of the victimization seems to be founded on the belief that the 
victim is either actively responsible for the rape or at least colludes 
in the process. Jurors attributed responsibility to the victim for will-
ingly accompanying the defendant prior to the rape (directly counter to 
presented testimony), for being in a college beer bar in the first place, 
and for being responsible for assaulting the defendant sexually as evi-
denced in the following quotes: Female: "Probably was her fault, she 
got with him." Male: "There's also the question of the Jail West, the 
place. Used to be a pretty wild place--a lot wilder than now." Female: 
"Maybe she was drunk. When you're drunk it can change all kinds of 
things. Girls who wouldn't do anything sober when drunk start attacking 
a guy." Notice that the juror made no comment about the possibility of 
the reverse situation in which the female could have been assaulted by a 
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drunken male, as presented in the testimony. Juries thus exhibited a 
consistent tendency to hold the victim to SOi,Je degree responsible for her 
rape. 
6. Leniency shift 
All of the experimental juries refused to convict the defendant. The 
females in the pretest group voted to convict the defendant by a 67 per-
cent to 33 percent margin. None of the 30 females in the experimental 
group voted for conviction on the final ballot. Sometime in the delibera-
tion proceedings-or conditions surrounding the deliberation process 25 
percent of the jurors experienced a leniens:y shift. .Several factors are 
suggested by the data and observations of the experimenter. Female jurors 
significantly more often than male jurors changed their votes after the 
first ballot. According to experimental observation, female more often 
then male jurors behaved in a nonassertive manner during the deliberation 
interaction. They hesitated to pursue a heated discussion. They sat si-
lently at times rather than advance arguments to the contrary, particular-
ly when the speaker was male. For the most part, they did not challenge 
the sexist assumptions of their peers. In light of the finding from the 
control group that the jurors should have approximately 82.2 percent re-
call for the presented trial material, the verdicts of each respective 
jury cannot be based on sheer failure of recall for the facts in the case. 
Two factors must be discussed in consideration of the leniency shift 
observed in all of the juries. One, the subjects know that they are in 
an experiment rather than an actual trial. The experimental sequence in 
the court and deliberation invoked high mundane realism conditions. Dur-
ing deliberations, jurors often prefaced their discussion concerning 
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verdicts with conunents such a.s "In real life"; "If this were for real, and 
we were deciding if this guy is going to prison." These statements indi-
cate that the subjects were taking their responsibility seriously although 
they were aware of the difference between the experimental and actual jury 
service. Secondly, the leniency shift could have been accelerated due 
to the restricted age range of the jurors. The subjects are at a time in 
their lives when they are malleable to social influences. Yet, the fact 
remains that all experimental jurors were currently eligible to serve as 
actual jurors in Payne County. There must be similar social pressures in 
any jury regardless of its specific age composition, since all juries are 
faced with an ambiguous situation which must be resolved if at all possi-
ble. Some jurors were able to resist social consensus attempts through 
the first two ballots, although all juries arrived at a consensus by the 
third ballot. In all juries the final verdict was in the direction of 
the initial majority opinion. Some jurors were swayed into a leniency 
shift to align themselves with. a reasonable doubt standard. A few ex-
pressed a standard more strict than the reasonable doubt standard and 
preferred a "beyond the shadow of a doubt" standard. This conservatism 
alone cannot account for the leniency shift. In the American system of 
justice the presumption of innocence always rests with the defendant, 
which exerts a similar conservative influence during actual criminal 
trials. 
C. Conclusion 
The jurors revealed conservative and traditional attitudes toward 
women on the Attitudes Toward Women Questionnaire. They were modestly 
dogmatic as a group as measured by the Trohdahl and Powell's Short-Form 
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Dogmatism Scale (1965). They refused to convict a defendant on rape 
charges on the basis of evidence sufficient to convince 53 percent of 
their peers. They spent a preponderance of their deliberation time 
discussing the testimony and character of the prosecutrix. They oper-
ated under mythological beliefs regarding the nature and dynamics of 
rape. Some jurors paid attention to the judge's instruction regarding 
the law and rules of evidence while some jurors either do not understand 
or they do not apply them. The experimental juries assembled for this 
investigation of the impact of juror attitude on the disposition of a rape 
trial have revealed that attitudes they .hold prior to serving as jurors 
affect the outcome of a rape trial. Generally the attitudes are conser-
vative regarding the role of women in American society and thus hold the 
woman responsible for her violation if she has already violated any of the 
conservative strictures regarding women's approved scope of behaviors. 
The conservative standards of "reasonable doubt" used by these jurors 
virtually insure that an innocent man would rarely if ever be convicted of 
a rape which was perpetrated without sensational features and with a mini-
mum of physical harm. In light of the current findings, guilty men would 
rarely be convicted under the same conditions. In this author's opinion, 
in order to counter the effects of sexism and conservative beliefs regard-
ing the proper standard for women's behavior prosecutors should as a 
matter of course add an expert \vitness on rape as a social phenomenon to 
counter the effects of juror misinformation regarding the nature and dy-
namics of rape. As individual women become more assertive in interperson-
al situations such as jury deliberations, they will have more overt 
evidence of the courage of their convictions. One effect of that change 
could well be a higher conviction rate for rapists. A second effect could 
be that fewer women will be raped as they grow into the power of an 
active rather than reactive stance with life. Men will not cease to 
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rape until the crime is at least as hazardous to the assailant as to the 
victim. The legal system will not change its sexist treatment of rape 
victims until society no longer accepts the validity of that sexism. 
There can be little change in that direction until women no longer pas-
sively accept sexual assault and internalize the guilt and pain surround-
ing the experience. If and when women begin to turn the anger from their 
violations and restrictions into a process of constructive change, social 
and legal sexism will at last fail. 
Rape as a social issue is a specialized form of interpersonal vio-
lence. Through its humiliation and objectification of the victim, rape 
is the logical weapon of sexual subjugation. The current controversy 
about rape originated with women's use of violence in resistance or in 
revenge against their assailants. These issues sparked much debate and 
some reform in the concepts of individual rights and criminal justice. 
The data suggest that the next issue of importance in the evolution of 
the rape issue is a change in the cultural attitudes of and toward women. 
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMATION RECALL QUESTIONNAIRE 
CIRCLE THE LETTER OF THE CORRECT ANSWER 
1. The complainant was: 
(a) Karen Brown 
(b) Barbara Spears 
(c) Jill James 
(d) Linda Daniels 




3. How did the defendant and complainant come to share each other's 
company on the night in question? 
(a) a date 
(b) they went to drink beer 
(c) he kidnapped her 
(d) testimony varies on this point 
4. Where did they part company that evening? 
(a) on the Strip (Washington Street) 
(b) in the country 
(c) 6th and Main Streets 
(d) Miller and Main Streets 
5. What did the testimony of the police officer concern? 
(a) arrest of the defendant 
6. 
7. 
(b) intake report on the complainant 
(c) intoxication of the defendant while driving 
(d) bruises on the complainant 
The defendant claims he is not guilty due to: 
(a) mistaken identity 
(b) impotence 
(c) consent 
(d) extenuating circumstances 





8. Was the defendant intoxicated? 
(a) yes 
(b) no 
9. The defendant was armed with: 
(a) a tire iron 
(b) a gun 
(c) a knife 
(d) nothing 
10. According to the doctor's testimony, the victim was bruised on her: 
(a) neck and vagina 
(b) back 
(c) neck only 
(d) legs 
11. According to testimony, the defendant threatened the complainant 
that: 
(a) he would leave her in the country 
(b) he would blackmail her 
(c) he would kill her 
(d) he would beat her up 
12. Did the doctor find semen or male fluids in the vaginal specimen? 
(a) yes 
(b) no 
13. The doctor spent 
(a) 0-5 




14. The defendant and complainant went: 
(a) to an oil lease 
(b) to Gibson's parking lot 
(c) to a graveyard 
(d) drinking on the strip 
15. The complainant resisted the defendant by: 
(a} scratching him 
(b) protesting verbally 
(c) fighting back physically 
(d) the victim did not resist 
16. The victim was accompanied to the Jail West by: 
(a} the defendant 
(b) Ray Houston 
(c) Barbara Spears 
(d) Karen Brown 
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17. The standard that jurors use in determining the guilt or innocence 




(a) greater than 50% doubt 
(b) beyond the shadow of a doubt 
(c) beyond a reasonable doubt 
(d) without a doubt 
An essential element in the legal definition of 
(a) vaginal penetration 
(b) ejaculation 
(c) harm to the victim 
(d) chastity of the victim 
The defendant was arrested: 
(a) the same evening 
(b) the next day 
(c) one week after the incident 
Where was the complainant's purse? 
(a) in the defendant's car 
(b) in the Jail West 
(c) in the country 
rape is: 
APPENDIX B 
WAIVER RELEASE AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
In consideration of permitting me, , to 
participate in the following described activity: Serve as a juror in an 
experiment being conducted by Gail Walker, entitled "Psycho-Legal Aspects 
of Rape," beginning on the day of , 1978, I hereby voluntari-
ly release, discharge, waive, and relinquish any and all actions or causes 
of action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death occuring 
to me, arising as a result of engaging or participating in said activity 
or any activities incidental thereto, wherever or however the same may oc-
cur and for whatever period said activities or participation may continue. 
I, for myself, my heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns hereby re-
lease, waive, discharge and relinquish any action or causes of action, 
aforesaid, which may hereafter arise for me and my estate, and agree that 
under no circumstances will I or my heirs, executors, administrators, and 
assigns prosecute, present any claim for personal injury, property damage, 
or wrongful death against Gail Walker. It is my intention by this instru-
ment to exempt and relieve Gail Walker from liability for personal injury, 
property damage, or wrongful death caused by negligence. 
I understand that I am agreeing to participate as a juror in a mock 
courtroom procedure and that the subject matter to deal with in said 
courtroom procedure will involve a rape case, which will include testimony 
and evidence relating explicity details concerning the alleged rape and 
will involve portrayal of the rape sequence, to include the use of sugges-
tive words and words which may be offensive and considered to be obscene. 
I acknowledge that I have read the foregoing and have been fully and 
completely advised to the potential dangers incidental to engaging in the 
activity described herein above and am fully aware of the legal conse-
quences of signing this instrument. 






ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN SCALE 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
The statements listed below describe attitudes toward the role of women in 
society that different people have. There are no right or wrong answers, 
only opinions. You are asked to express your feelings about each state-
ment by indicating whether you (A) agree strongly, (B) agree mildly, (C) 
disagree mildly, or {D) disagree strongly. Please indicate your opinion 
by blackening either A, B, C, or D on the answer sheet for each item. 
1. Swearing and obscenity are more repulsive in the speech of a woman 
than of a man. 
2. Women should take increasing responsibility for leadership in solving 
the intellectual and social problems of the day. 
3. Both husband and wife should be allowed the same grounds for divorce. 
4. Telling dirty jokes should be mostly a masculine prerogative. 
5. Intoxication among women is worse than intoxication among men. 
6. Under modern economic conditions with women being active outside the 
horne, men should share in household tasks such as washing dishes and 
doing the laundry. 
7. It is insulting to women to have the "obey" clause remain in the 
marriage service. 
8. There should be a strict merit system in job appointment and promo-
tion without regard to sex. 
9. A woman should be as-free as a man to propose marriage. 
10. Women should worry less about their rights and more about becoming 
good wives and mothers. 
11. Women earning as much as their dates should bear equally the expense 
when they go out together. 
12. Women should assume their rightful place in business and all the 
professions along with men. 
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13. A woman should not expect to go to exactly the same places or to have 
quite the same freedom of action as a man. 
14. Sons in a family should be given the more encouragement to go to 
college than daughters. 
15. It is ridiculous for a woman to run a locomotive and for a man to 
darn socks. 
16. In general, the father should have greater authority than the mother 
in the bringing up of children. 
17. Women should be encouraged not to become sexually intimate with any-
one before marriage, even their fiances. 
18. The husband should not be favored by law over the wife in the 
disposal of family property or income. 
19. Women should be concerned with their duties of child bearing and 
house tending, rather than with desires for professional and business 
careers. 
20. The intellectual leadership of a community should be largely in the 
hands of men. 
21. Economic and social freedom is worth far more to women than accept-
ance of the ideal of feminity which has been set up by men. 
22. On the average, women should be regarded as less capable of contrib-
uting to economic production than are men. 
23. There are many jobs in which men should be given preference over 
women in being hired or promoted. 
24. Women should be given equal opportunity with men for apprenticeship 
in the various trades. 
25. The modern girl is entitled to the same freedom from regulation and 
control that is given to the modern boy. 
APPENDIX D 
TROHDAHL AND POWELL'S SHORT FORM DOGMATISM SCALE 
JURY ------------------
JUROR NUMBER ----------
DIRECTIONS: Please answer all of the questions. They are intended to 
measure your opinions--there are no right or wrong answers. Answer them 
according to the following scale: 
1 = Agree very much 5 = Disagree a little 
2 = Agree on the whole 6 = Disagree on the whole 
3 = Agree a little 7 = Disagree very much 
4 = Don't know 
1. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what is 
going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted. 
2. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he is 
wrong. 
3. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the 
truth and those who are against the truth. 
4. Most people just don't know what's good for them. 
5. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there 
is probably only one which is correct. 
6. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form 
of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent. 
7. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something 
important. 
8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve 
my personal problems. 
9. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the 
paper they are printed on. 
10. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. 
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11. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that 
life becomes meaningful. 
12. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others. 
13. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because 
it usually leads to betrayal of our own side. 
14. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on 
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects. 
15. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the 
future that counts. 
16. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common. 
17. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several 
times to make sure I am being understood. 
18. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition 
is to become a great man like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare. 
19. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, 
it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain 
political groups. 
20. It is better to be a dead hero than a live coward. 
SCALE: 
1 = Agree very much 5 Disagree a little 
2 Agree on the whole 6 Disagree on the whole 
3 = Agree a little 7 = Disagree very much 
4 = Don't know 
APPENDIX E 
GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
JURY DATE -----------------------------------
JUROR NUMBER FOREMAN --------------------- --------------------------------
CASE VERDICT ------------------------------ ---------------------------------
NAME ______________________________ _ 
SEX: M F (circle one) 
AGE: RACE ------ -------------------------
MARITAL STATUS: SINGLE MARRIED 
Have you ever served on a jury? 




Have you or a member of your family ever been convicted of a crime? 
yes no 
Are you related to or friends with a police officer? 
yes no .law enforcement officer? yes no 
Have you ever been the victim of a crime? yes no 
if yes, what type of crime? __________________________________ ___ 
Was it a crime against your person (such as assault)? yes no 
Was it a crime against your property? yes no 
Was it a sex crime? yes no 
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What is your occupation? __________ ~-------------------------
Spouse's occupation?----------------------------~-----­
What is your religion? --------------------------------------
How often do you attend church? weekly monthly yearly 
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never 
What level of education have you last completed? ______________________ __ 
Of what social groups are you a me1nber? 
When what I do is of no force as to the purpose for which I 
do it, let it be of force to as great a degree as it can. 
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Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis: PSYCHO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF RAPE 
Major Field: Psychology 
Biographical: 
Personal: Born in Clayton, Oklahoma, March 24, 1952, the daughter 
of Mr. and Mrs. F. B. Walker. 
Education: Graduated from Clayton High School, Clayton, Oklahoma, 
in May, 1970; received the Bachelor of Science degree in Psy-
chology from Oklahoma State University in 1974; received the 
Master of Science degree in Psychology from Oklahoma State 
University in 1976; completed requirements for the Doctor of 
Philosophy degree at Oklahoma State University in July, 1978. 
Professional Experience: Graduate instructor, Department of Psy-
chology, Oklahoma State University, 1975-1977; graduate re-
search assistant, Department of Psychology, 1974-1976; 
Oklahoma State University Task Force on Curriculum, Women's 
Council, 1976-1977; member, Oklahoma Womens' Studies Associa-
tion, 1977-1978; member, Steering Committee, South Central 
Region, National Women's Studies Association, 1977-1978; 
Regional Delegate-at-Large, National Women's Studies Associa-
tion (founding convention), San Francisco, California, · 
January 13-16, 1977; member, Representative International 
Women's Year Caucus, Oklahoma Women's Conference, June, 1977; 
Representative Caucus Delegate, National Women's Conference, 
Houston, Texas, November, 1977. 
Activities and Honors: President's and Dean's Honor Rolls; Phi 
Kappa Phi; Phi Delta Kappa; Association of Women Students, 
Chair of Education Committee, 1976-1977; Psychology Graduate 
Student Association, Social Psychology Representative, 1976-
1977, and 1977-1978. 
